Originally presented as a speech by Joseph Jastrow to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the American Psychological Association, this paper on the history of psychology was first published in The Psychological Review in 1917.
A commemorative occasion justifies a retrospective, though hardly a reminiscent mood. The personal justification lies in the fact that I speak as one of a small group - in this and all countries - who have held a monogamous professorship of psychology for a quarter century. The contrast of then and now stands forth partly as a shift in intellectual temperament, partly as a diverging succession of interests. Both are responsible for the historical moving-picture, which to our near vision still flickers by reason of imperfect fusion.
The dominant interest under which I began to profess psychology was clearly the experimental one; it set a novel and a positive programme. Equally assertive was the physiological plank. The two stamped one's alliance, in a sense made one a partisan. The emblem of the one was the laboratory, of the other an evolutionary faith and a sense of the reality of the body in the affairs of mind. They might have been emblazoned as a Hipp chronoscope rampant, and a copy of Darwin couchant. The bearer of this coat-of-arms was in many quarters under suspicion. He was more than a radical, less than a renegade. By implication he was challenging the accredited "mental science" of the colleges, which was a branch - in some cases a stunted twig - of philosophy, and a perquisite of the president. At educational gatherings - even more inconsequential and vaporous then than now - he was asked to defend the superiority of mental over rational psychology; also to indicate what was the fate of the soul under the new regime. To the philosophers the psychologists seemed needlessly young and irresponsible; to the men of science they seemed out of focus or tangential. Now that the philosopher and the biologist have become our ready allies, the attitude toward us as militant invaders is almost forgotten, and may well remain so.
The credentials upon which psychology added a star to the united sciences were significant ones; it advanced from territorial governorship to statehood by patent of ancient right reestablished under successful pioneering. It was not - as in the case of sociology - a squatter settlement in unoccupied land where the adjoining sciences failed to meet, but the declaration of independence of a domain quite too large and distinctive for colonial status. The first insistence was naturally upon technique. The novel sight, which to some was amusing, was not the philosopher descended to earth from his mythical habitat in the clouds, but actually donning overalls and using his hands. The garb seemed strange and lowly, even grimy. But rapidly enough the new psychology - like the new woman - became a more familiar and less forbidding Erscheinung, even revealing the eternally human traits. Problems followed the eclectic clue of technique. The early Wundt was compilational rather than systematic, though the Teutonic Gründlichkeit extended to architectural plan as well as building material. Wundt set the interests of the first group of American students of modern psychology, in which ancient and honorable body I may claim a place. The rallying point was the Johns Hopkins University - itself as new as psychology - under the leadership of the author of "Aspects of German Culture," G. Stanley Hall. He, however, found a small group of students already waiting; he quickly attracted others, and then (after five years) transferred his influence to Clark University. Stanley Hall's doctorate was the first given in psychology; Harvard University, 1878. My own was the second and the first given at Johns Hopkins specifically in psychology.
In so far as American psychology was a native product, it reflected the pioneering spirit, the spirit of William James. No speaker on a commemorative occasion would forego the privilege of placing a wreath upon his monument. He was the first among us to bear the title professor of psychology; he holds that position not by priority but by preeminence. He stands as the exponent of the value of varieties of psychological experience. He made clear in his own person the intimate dependence of pursuit upon temperament. It was peculiarly fortunate for the recognition of the new psychology that its academic status was assured by the acknowledged leadership of so commanding an academician, so distinguished a scholar, so great a man. It was equally fortunate for the career of psychology in America that the stamp of the Jamesian genius pervaded its progress and directed its unfoldment to the desirability of seeing psychology steadily and seeing it whole.
The development of a new discipline in a new country encounters directly the social situation. Of first consequence was the accredited recognition by the universities and colleges; which meant the establishment of courses that could play a worthy part in the curriculum. In the conflict of classics and science, which in the days I am recalling was reaching its declining and conciliatory stage, psychology occupied an advantageous position, though it was exposed to the danger of falling down between two stools: the unrecognized stool of the laboratory, the exalted throne of philosophy. Yet the trend of opinion was pacifist and not militant. In the readjustment of the curriculum psychology may more frequently have been offered as a compromise than as a solution. But all this was helpful; the method of intelligence would have been better; but the method of trial and error was acceptable. Pragmatically the situation offered positions to those who would undertake the new training. In the words of the college song:
"One day the summons came out of the West;
'Get Ph.D's and come,' rang the request."
I may readily indicate the status of teaching at that time by mentioning that when I responded there was no elementary text available. Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology' both in title and content was about the only widely read book that reflected the new data and the new interpretation. The pioneer contribution was the invaluable work of Professor Ladd; and this celebrated its quarter century a few years ago by the appearance of the Ladd-Woodworth edition. The text implied a more generous course and a better type of preparation than the college curriculum afforded. To the teacher of psychology this monumental work was a daily support, and to the ablest students, often of nearly the same age as the teacher, a guide, philosopher and friend. The work of James appeared three years later. With the laboratory and seminar the lecture and research and the training course, and then the American Journal of Psychology, at Johns Hopkins; with the large personal influence and the systematic work at Yale, the decisive prominence of psychology in the graduate work in philosophy at Harvard, American psychology was launched. The auspices could not have been more favorable. The varieties of psychological experience represented by these creative personalities assured the development of psychology in this country a breadth of outlook, a soundness of technique, and a vital contact with the dominant intellectual interests, which have been most important assets. They may well stand central in our commemorative respect, a tribute to Hall, Ladd and James.
For a time the development of courses, the preparation of texts, the establishment of academic positions kept the small band of psychologists busy; also many of them could secure their positions only by a willingness to share the responsibility for allied teaching, mainly in philosophy, logic and ethics. Indeed these disciplines as commonly represented the major preparation, to which psychology was added. But the outward and visible sign of the psychologist was his laboratory; and the growth of these both for instruction and research represents the most distinctive American contribution. There is no parallel to it elsewhere. In a direct sense the laboratory is responsible for the largest increase in varieties of psychological experience. It set the experimental attitude in inquiry, and this of all the several independent factors unmistakably shaped the career which we are passing in review. It has always been true in the history of science that the kind of questions men ask is determined by the facilities which they have acquired in answering them; though it is equally true that the sense of limitation of facilities has been the motive force in extending them to the inclusion of larger interests and newer problems.
I propose to touch only upon the larger varieties of psychological experience thus furthered. They may be summarized under five overlapping waves. The first is the direct exploration of the intimate structure of mental process, the direct analytical interest of the man of the laboratory. It immerses him in technique and device and the envisagement of problems; it immerses him unduly unless it carries with it the poise conferred by interpretation.
The second is the comparative interest, which in recent years has almost entirely reconstructed the view of animal behavior, and has yielded its interpretative product in the "behaviorist" position. Its high-power study of the beginnings of mind gives it the apect of psychological histology; but its far-reaching conclusions extend to the entire evolutionary programme of the mental life. It forces upon psychology the problem of the distinctive nature of the human endowment, and the stages of differentiation in the onward series.
One may place third and thus in the central position the growth, almost the overgrowth, of applied psychology. This reflects the practical stress of the environment and the pragmatic temper of the American Weltanschauung. It was born in the laboratory. The term 'mental test' is so distinctive of English, which in this case is American usage, that it has been adopted in German, French and Italian literature. It arose from the consideration that analysis is not only of the factors of a process but of their place in the individual psychology. The work of Galton should be recalled on this occasion for the reason that while the biological aspects of his versatile studies attracted most attention in England, the psychological significance of his methods and results was more influential on this side. He emphasized the application of psychological tests in combination with anthropological traits. He established the first laboratory for such purpose; and it may be recorded that the first installation on this side was in connection with the World's Columbian exposition in Chicago, 1893, where also the visible embodiment of experimental psychology was shown to the public.
In applied psychology two aspects of psychological experience were involved: the first emphasized that the training of mind could proceed wisely only upon a knowledge of mind; and the teacher was referred, not without misgivings, to psychology. The second aspect was focused upon the ability of the tests to reveal individual capacity. Thus were laid the foundations of educational psychology which in the present outlook looms so momentously large that it heralds the dividing line of further specialization. It is making for a competitive share in professional status; the future division of function is indicated, though localization is somewhat uncertain. With the present expansion of departments one exponent is likely to assume responsibility for the analytical, theoretical disciplines, and another for their applications. Upon the warmly disputed question whether pedagogy is a science or an imposition, and its pursuit a profession or a misfortune, we may maintain an impeccably neutral position. We cannot overlook the fact that the psychology of the schooling processes, by sheer force of practical importance, is entitled to a commanding place in the training of teachers; while collaterally the investigations thus resulting give promise of rounding out the analyses of the learning processes to the great benefit of general problems of primary import. Here lie varieties of psychological experience of sterling value. To some the field has the appearance of extensions of city plots in unborn suburbs, neatly staked out in building-lots, with cement sidewalks but no habitations. The promoter in psychology is not unknown; but the new settlement seems less speculative to one who has a retrospective standard.
A distinctly settled section is that of tests of capacity, the Binet-Simon addition. Applied individually the test invites a diagnostic use. The vocational pressure is intense; it should be encouraged and only its premature and cock-sure decisions resisted. It is characteristic that the sins of commission and omission alike are far more common among the practical cultivator of trees than among the more theoretical conservator of forests. Get-wise-quick methods offer the most lucrative rewards to the needy psychologist. At the moment we are besieged by requests to enlighten men of affairs how to choose employees, how to detect capacities, and by individuals how to increase mental efficiency. Only one who is blind to the lessons of history can fail to see the dangers in this great white way of psychology. One cannot look upon phrenology, physiognomy and the reading of character as merely the slums of psychology. Whatever the rating of the fakir, his customers come from all shades and grades of education. Here may be gathered interesting varieties of psychological experience; and a candidatus philosophicus in psychology may find a promising thesis by illuminating the psychology of fraud. Yet psychology will be shirking its social responsibilities if it declines to cross an unsavory threshold. It is not a sign of virtue to fear to tread, just because frauds rush in. Too proud to investigate is not a proper attitude. The problem of vocational and individual fitness is a wholly legitimate and, for the cautious and modest psychologist, an engaging pursuit. The reputation of the psychologist will depend upon the restraint with which he exercises authority, and pronounces judgments.
The practical varieties of psychological experience are worthy of respect in their own right. We all know that the road from theory to practice is the more indirect the more complex the situation. Qualities are far more generic than their applications. We must insist upon the legitimacy of the psychological perspective and decline to assume while yet we respect that of the practical inquirer with a narrower interest. A man will become a persuasive salesman, or a shrewd employer or a good teacher far more regularly upon the basis of a general equipment than of correspondence courses. At all events it is in the interpretation of the underlying qualities of men that psychology, pragmatically disposed, finds its metier, however ready to utilize the trends of employment, and to direct inquiry to practically significant relations. The two perspectives must differ. The variety of experience is valuable; the forms of experience imposed by modern conditions acquire a peculiar importance; but none of these interests should distort the far more significant varieties of an historically larger and intrinsically deeper experience. In precisely the same sense in which the sociologist, fixing his attention upon modern conditions, will be handicapped by a narrow vision if he forgets that what he is studying with a specialized interest is in reality a transferred biological situation to be interpreted under the principles of biological relations, will the applied psychologist become a mere trained craftsman if his sense of design is unilluminated by the interpretative insight conferred by long immersion in the principles of psychology.
I have chosen deliberately to enlarge upon the practical varieties of psychological experience, for the reason that in this vista the retrospective view directs the enterprise which will plan the highways of the future. The attitude of American psychologists toward the possible and desirable applications of their pursuits, even the mode of capitalization of their personal value for public consumption, seems to me so peculiarly important that I have chosen to project an "insert" on a larger scale in the moving picture which I am unreeling. The psychologist, I repeat, must insist upon complete authority as an architect of his science; what consideration shall he give to the expressed needs and wishes of a possible clientele? The practical and the theoretical perspectives are distinct; how shall they be made to converge, and yet retain that singleness of vision which is indispensable to a solid, realistic, stereoscopic effect?
It requires no prophetic but only a presbyopic vision to foresee that the insistent demands of practice will form a league to enforce attention. The psychological practitioner is coming; upon us rests the responsibility that, when he comes he shall be in no measure a quack or an opportunist, neither papal nor encyclopedic, nor pretend to be all things to all men. The training of psychologists cannot undertake the development of geniuses, who as a rule have found the academic environment unstimulating. A scientifically minded sense of proportion is the central equipment; with it must be combined a clinical sense for the recognition of varieties of experience when encountered. I resent the implication that because a large amount of money is spent in advertising, the psychology of advertising thereby gains in significance or importance. I welcome the fact that the actual interest in advertising supplies a variety of psychological experience which we may utilize to the full. Problems that loom large in application may have but slight illumination in principle, and be rather barren in enlightenment. The analysis of a practical occupation into its underlying factors is the legitimate work of the psychological practitioner; advice will gain in value as it strikes root in a soil enriched by scientific cultivation. The tendency which most I deplore is the neglect of the wider and the truer interpretation, because in some of its aspects it is less amenable to the rigid technique of the quantitative method. Falling in love with technique may be a pleasant but is hardly a rational indulgence. It forms one of the temptations, the idols of the practical mind. You see it pitiably at work in the pursuit of efficiency, with the result that there is more attention paid to cost-accounting than to the value of the article when produced. You see its menacing shadow thrown across the academic portals in the impertinent attempt to measure service by unit-hours and neglect quality and all the finer values incommensurate with the crude and irrelevant yardstick. If the method is continued, education will have but one purpose, ambitious and charitable at once: to make people efficient though incompetent. My plea is for the recognition, selection and cultivation of a psychological competency for practitioner and theorist alike; which is a plea, in an expert sense, for the varieties of psychological experience.
I have referred to the danger of mistaking a quantitative result for an important one, of supposing that what is measurable is significant; likewise to the danger of supposing that what is practically demanded is by that right entitled to a large place in a scientific perspective. With these is combined the danger of proceeding to far-flung battle lines of conclusions upon a slender campaign of experimental results. None of these dangers operates simply; they combine subtly and intrude subconsciously, as is the manner of fallacy and her tribe. I can point the moral most quickly by using a tale for adornment, though I run the risk of stepping upon toes, the owners of which I respect. The extent of my hardihood will be clear when I say that I shall illustrate in terms of that vexed question of the mental differences of men and women. On the basis of well-designed experiments one observer concludes that women are less disposed than men to be affected by argument. In deciding whether one aggregation of markings contains more or fewer individual components than another, the women proved more tenacious of their original opinions (whether this is consistency or obstinacy is an unwise question) than did the men. Ergo women are less desirable than men as members of a jury. In citing this bit of evidence I am fortunate in that I agree with the significance of the findings; but I remain wholly unconvinced by the conclusion.
The second illustration finds me in the reverse attitude. On the basis of a painstaking and well-devised series of sensory and mental tests, the convergence of results measuring specific capacities proves to be far more striking than the divergences of men and women. Upon these data is based the conclusion that intellectual distinctions among the sexes do not exist; they are either the result of imposition of masculine dominance upon femine complacency, or the prejudiced views of tradition. The comprehensive evidence of the varieties of psychological experience embodied in the history of culture is cavalierly disregarded. Everything is ruled out of court except the findings of the laboratory in parallel columns of figures. The contributions to the subject are disposed of as belonging either to the literature of fact or the literature of opinion; which to my view is at once a specious and destructive distinction. Your quantitative fact, however exactly determined, must pass the judgment-seat of interpretation, personified in the venerable and wordly-wise figure of experience; then only will its contributive value appear. On the other hand opinion may be as valueless as gossip, and as important as any brand of truth accessible to the present generation. More particularly, the best of opinion is founded upon exactly the same appreciation of precise investigation, is imbued with precisely the same scientific method, reflects a parallel training and allegiance to accredited principles, as that which guides the experimental devotees. To disregard such contributions and to ignore historical experience on the strength of data authentic in their own province but only modestly significant outside of it, is to violate conspicuously the appreciation of varieties of psychological experience, which constitutes the most important equipment for the loyal psychologist.
Not to court misunderstanding, let me explain that I have properly selected instances of unquestioned authority, and also that the questionings which I have raised are directed with unbiased neutrality to point out the prejudice that is invited by generic interpretation, and by the neglect thereof. If we enlarge small findings to large conclusions we exceed our warrant. If the experimentalist insists upon the supreme value of his experience above all other varieties, proposes to disregard scientifically rigorous thinking expended in other problems than his, is convinced that the quantitative pattern is the only authentic one, that amenability to measurement is the indispensable passport for psychological citizenship, the future of psychology faces an undesirable and unnecessary impoverishment. Moreover it is just because the promising growth of the applied field favors so largely the sharply defined and technically interesting varieties of psychological experience, that the pure experimentalist should safeguard the comprehensive and broader aspects of his function.
With pardonable overemphasis I have cited the logical procedures leading to an agreement with Mme. de Stael: les ames n'ont pas des sexes. According to this view minds have no sex; according to Freud they have little else. And thus we reach a further variety of experience in the abnormal. The ascendency of the Freudian movement occupies the head-line in this section of the revue; whether by reputation or by notoriety critics cannot agree. Either view pointedly illustrates the complex significance of varieties of psychological experience and of the attitudes that lead to their favor or disfavor. Freudian psychology must be saved even more persistently from its friends than from its detractors. As I grasp its bearing, it forms an important and essentially true contribution made by the wrong men; its germinal ideas are sound despite the loosely woven evidence. To some the Freudian orchestra makes unseemly noise and nothing else; others hail it as the music of the future. Personally I am convinced that the acceptable Freudian sonata remains to be written; it will be composed by one imbued with the spirit of its method and possessed of a rare sense of the value of phrasing. The sex motif will be less insistent and strident, not silenced or ignored but sublimated. I have every sympathy with those who are nauseated by its seemingly cherished obscenity, and irritated by its seemingly malicious slander of the human mind. But my logical conscience rebukes me by a reminder that any such attitude is irrelevant. The Freudian principles and the Freudian mechanisms must be considered for their value as varieties of psychological experience, quite apart from the bad form and bad taste and bad logic of their support and supporters; the merit of the cause or the campaign and of the tactics or munitions must be judged separately. The Freudian reconstruction - for a time obscurely and disparagingly received, and only recently advancing to a conspicuous place - has vitalized a large realm of observation bearing upon the abnormal but equally valid for the normal experience. In every future retrospective view its place is secure. For the moment it may impress us as a capricious, disorderly vers libre, a libel upon the fair name of poetry or psychology; when the exotic and chaotic and neurotic elements have given way to fairer expression its contributions will be more fairly judged and seen.
My concern with the abnormal is limited to its extension of the varieties of experience, and their interpretation for normal use. This the Freudian doctrine attempts. In attempts it practically in the method of psychoanalysis, but confines the procedure to the disclosure of entanglements and disqualifications that impede and distress normal functioning. Yet psychoanalysis is a broader practical procedure, related to an applied psychology and the allied interest of diagnosis in all difficult situations. It embraces the experimental methods in its use of the association-material. It brings to the fore the province of the subconscious which constitutes one of the most significant enlargements of psychological experience, but one readily misinterpreted in favor of unassimilated hypothesis. The inclusion of the domain of the subconscious stands as one of the most significant annexations in the retrospect - a distinct settlement of territory wrested by a difficult exploration in an uncertain jungle.
Going back twenty-five years, one comes upon the thick of a fray that almost threatened a world-war in psychology. For the first five or ten years of my professional experience the popular view of a psychologist was a ghost-hunter. Psychical research held the field of popular favor; that a laboratory was anything else than a séance-chamber seemed incredible. The psychologist had to listen to inane stories of coincidences, that spoiled many a promising dinner-party. When he couldn't explain a lame and distorted tale, his inconsequence was made shamelessly and publicly evident. Scepticism was considered a mask for ignorance, and an unpleasant substitute for the lie direct. But the most remarkable aspect of the movement was the hold it gained upon men eminent in science - but not in psychology - through whose advocacy psychical research attained a prestige far beyond that accorded to psychology as we know it. Indeed in many quarters the interest in psychology was prompted by a hope that it would solve questions foremost in the minds of psychic researchers - such as telepathy and the survival of personality. That in some sense significant varieties of psychological experience pervaded that racially old field of belief, that persistent recurrence of reversal of orderly mental sequence, was a position variously defended. All this has in these days the flavor of dried mementos. Yet it was only a half a dozen years ago, in these scientifically dedicated precincts, that a small group of us found it necessary to allay popular and learned unrest in regard to the specific mechanism by which a homemade basswood table defied the law of physics in the presence of a much heralded and sponsored Neapolitan and of a company sufficiently impressed to pay handsomely for each levitation of a skillful foot. The experience was at once humiliating and enlightening. Fraud-hunting as an indoor sport may have some zest if not value; or it may become a social obligation. It has helped to dissipate the surviving myth that the man of the academy is wholly lost in the mazes of a wicked world. Those of us who in the older days protested against the profanation of psychology, and were often snubbed for our insolence, may properly indulge in a moment of congratulation to the younger psychologists who have not this role to play. Yet the true interpretation of the phenomena that psychical research attempted to invite to unlawful secession remains a part of the gain of abnormal psychology.
The concluding phase of the composite psychological wave is represented by the psychology of social relations. Its pursuit obviously requires a capacity for broad interpretation, for the analysis of the deepest motives of human conduct, for the envisagement of underlying similarity of situation despite complexity of circumstance, for catching psychology on the hoof, and sensing its living products and pulsating throbs; my cental plea for catholicity of experience receives here its most direct justification. The laboratory with its simplified and scheduled analyses finds its corrective in the intricate worldly composite of conflicting forces. Social psychology represents the most elaborate phases of an applied science. It is applied in the tests of life. It quickens every interest that is entrusted to the psychologist, and justifies as it amplifies his problems. For it makes clear in how many directions psychology has a voice with other concerns, makes it clear that to be a psychologist implies a capacity to seize the psychological value of experience which to other interests presents different aspects and appeals, - to single out the psychological instruments in the orchestration of life. All life is of one living; the psychologist, far less than the devotee of other specialties can afford to diagram or artificialize his Fach. He should be in the world and of it, in the best sense an interpreter of human values, capacities, enterprises; for his is the duty of directing and safeguarding the precious mechanisms upon which all living proceeds. Such must be his insight and his training that he may be rewarded by the respect of his fellows in science, his cooperators in practical affairs.
I look to the increasing study of social psychology for a redemption from too restricted specialization, for a balance to the dangers of absorption in technique, for a compensation for the limitations of the quantitative method. A sense of the reality, of the richness and fullness, the complexity and conflict, the growths, changes and transformations of the mind's products permeates this field as no other. In a measure it projects the culmination of psychological experience; it projects culture and the vaster problems of political and social striving as a psychological evolution, testifying to the greatness of the forces of mind. And we of to-day are witnessing the largest and most appalling issues of estrangement in ideals, sentiments, allegiances, that the world has faced; the psychology of war must be considered in the establishment of enduring human relations. The world is going to be wisely ruled, the endeavors of organized men more sanely directed, the errors of the past less disastrously repeated, if a body of men find participation in the direction of affairs possessed of a psychological discernment; for this insight is as indispensable to modern conditions in certain relations as is an economical, a political, or a business sense in others.
Lying close to this domain and making a parallel appeal is a body of knowledge, engaging in itself and vital in its applications, which I select for special consideration. I do so because it sets forth so amply and so pointedly the qualifications of the psychologist; also because it presents manifold relations to all the several divisions of the present review, and thereby points the moral of my thesis. Dessoir in his "History of Psychology" recognizes it as one of the three great interests in the science of mind, with ancient antecedents and constant influence; he calls it psychognosis. In modern relations it may be viewed as an oblique or irregular section through the entirety of interests that form the composite of psychology; the specific disciplines consider the several fields more directly and disinterestedly. The nature of individual differences, the sources of these in human trends, their expression and emphasis in historical circumstance, their liabilities and possibilities in cultivation and decay, their contributions to human institutions - are all involved in psychognosis. The directions of temperament, the foundations of character, the total determinations of capacity and career form its subject matter. The temper of its pursuit is practical, but always with that wider and deeper foundation in varieties of human experience, which sends it back for analysis and authority to one and another discipline of psychology. It develops congenially under the type of interest that supports social psychology, has its strongest affiliations there; but it utilizes the entire range of psychological science and requires a catholic interpretation of the psychologist's function. Its restatement under the tremendous enrichment of the last twenty-five years of psychological investigation is an urgent desideratum of the present; and this obligation will do much to invite psychologists to that attitude toward their province which shall not be provincial but in the worthiest sense cosmopolitan.
The prospective and the prophetic venture is more engaging than the retrospective; commemorative occasions invite a Janus-faced, judicial attitude. The westward course of empire returning upon itself sets the gaze upon the east once more; with the rounding of the circle the conquests of the future turn to an inward advancement, to the perfection of the human equipment that comes from a comprehension of its nature, origin and history. In this vast reconstruction the psychologist comes to his own. He expresses and confers upon his disciples an interpretative sense, which in the bewilderment of change traces the orderly relations of law. Whatever the progress of the future, he recognizes in Kipling's words, that
We can bring no more to living,
Than the powers we bring to life.
Mar 18, 19 01:03 PM
Thought-provoking article on immoral actions by Jonathan Phillips, a cognitive scientist at the Moral Psychology Research Lab at Harvard University.
Mar 18, 19 10:00 AM
Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance by Leon Festinger and James Carlsmith was published in the 'Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.'
The premise for this classic piece of research was…
Mar 18, 19 06:10 AM
Great article on the concept of happiness.