

DRUG SMUGGLING BEHAVIOR

A Developmental Smuggling Model (Part 2)

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A Note About This Article

This article has been divided into two parts. Part one, published in the November/December 2003 *Forensic Examiner*, introduced the article and described a drug smuggler's perception of the current drug courier models. Next, it introduced a new developmental smuggling model (DSM) based on extensive research. Part one concluded with a description of the behavioral characteristics of the Phase-I (lowest-level) smuggler.

Part two of the article, published here, describes the behavioral characteristics of the higher-level Phase-II and Phase-III smugglers, and offers predictions based on the DSM model.

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Abstract

This article, in its entirety, presents a three-phase developmental model for the identification of smugglers and smuggling organizations. Information provided by an international smuggler is applied after cross-referencing it with declassified government documents, sources open to the public, and published literature. The smuggling model is reviewed and critiqued by agents from various government bureaus and services as well as criminal defense attorneys who are knowledgeable in this area. The developmental smuggling model (DSM) is then tested on two detainees who have been arrested for participating in smuggling operations.

Introduction

A unique situation emerged during my completion of a fitness to stand trial evaluation for the 17th Judicial Circuit Court in Winnebago County, Illinois. The individual being examined claimed that he was an international smuggler. Given the need to verify the assertions for the court and my interest in deriving behavioral data regarding the variances in smugglers, I carried out numerous in-depth interviews and conducted extensive psychological testing on the individual, in addition to cross-checking all given information against government records and databases from agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the U. S. Customs Service (Currently known as U.S. Customs and Border Patrol), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The result is a unique consortium of behavioral data that was assembled over

a 7-year period and used to develop a three-phase model of smuggling behavior in individuals and organizations. This model is referred to as the Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM). The data includes behavioral characteristics for all three phases of smuggling, as well as easily identifiable traits that will aid examiners and prosecutors in predicting behavioral outcomes. The efficacy of the DSM offers tangible characteristics thought to be common among smugglers in each phase of smuggling, including education, finances, loyalties, mannerisms, diversion tactics, and socialization factors, among others. The development of quantifiable behavioral characteristics, which this model includes, is critical for the correct identification of major smuggling corporations and the individuals that manage them. Assimilated information that is properly organized via the DSM is beneficial for the appropriate prosecution and sentencing of various types of smugglers, as well as the identification of currently unknown sources of smuggling.

Behavioral Characteristics of Phase II

A search of the literature did not produce research that could be used to confirm the construction of the Phase-II group in the DSM. Construction of a classification system for Phase II was instead done using information collected in the case study. With this caveat in mind, it is noted that the sole attraction of association within a Phase-II organization is the purpose of smuggling drugs into a country or within the borders of a country; i.e. drugs grown or manufactured in rural areas and then transported to cities within the same country for warehousing or distribution. Phase II subdivides into two other subgroups. The first subgroup is a con-

stellation of close friends (people who care about the welfare of each other). The second subgroup consists of a looser social network of associates who have more broadly based connections, such as gang affiliation, company employment, or shared geographical residence. Members in the second subgroup have a minimal amount of empathy concerning the welfare of others within the group.

A unique aspect of Phase-II organizations is that there are three types of corporations that may be involved in illicit smuggling as Phase-II organizations. The first is a corporation that was formed for the sole purpose of smuggling. The second is a corporation that was legitimate at the time of inception; however, due to liquidity problems, an illicit smuggling approach is employed to provide an alternative source of cash flow. The third type of corporation maintains a legitimate business plan, all-the-while participating in the smuggling arena. This third type of corporation divides into two subtypes.

In the case of the third type of corporation, the corporation is infected with smugglers who continue to perform their duties in the legitimate part of the business with the goal of engaging in a personal or group cover. These smugglers may be unknown to the rank and file (subtype 1) or unknown to management (subtype 2), depending on their job classification, the source of the smuggling activity within the corporation, and the extensiveness of the activity within the corporation. Given that the assets (i.e., equipment, routes, personnel, etc.) are already in place, small amounts of contraband, most likely handled by rank and file workers (subtype 1), can be conducted by groups of Phase-I caliber. These groups of Phase-I individuals have an advantage when compared to the Phase-II category, only because of the assets that surround them.

Both subtype 1 and subtype 2 of Phase II take advantage of their posi-

tion in the company to create a profit for themselves and do not provide a profit or a benefit to the company. In fact, subtype 1 as well as subtype 2 put the company at risk (i.e., increased violence, an atmosphere of intimidation, increased employee turnover rates, reduced productivity, negative publicity, etc.). There is a possibility that the subtype-2 individuals have histories of gang-related activities, maintain gang membership, or establish diffused criminal associations that are serendipitously beneficial for the facilitation of the network; they have a need to complete the common goal that must be achieved for profit to occur. While subtype-1 and subtype-2 individuals are similar in that they engage in illicit smuggling activity, they are very likely to betray each other when it is to their advantage, unlike the "friends" in Phase I. Although these individuals may not experience the empathy that permeates Phase I, they are, nevertheless, friends, and have usually known each other for a period of time.

Trust within the Phase-II group is a concern and is frequently addressed in the group. It is in the Phase-II group that "trust testing" is measured by the individual's willingness to behaviorally violate a legal statute. The individual must commit a felony to become a member in the Phase-II group. The subject in this study reported that on several occasions his job interview for inclusion in a Phase-II group required his stealing an aircraft (taking a plane) and delivering it to a specific airport. The second distinguishing behavioral feature of the Phase-II group is the increased number of times the group travels to a foreign country to secure contraband and smuggle it back.

While the bulk of the description of the Phase-II classification is derived from the case study, it is noted that Adler and Adler (1983, 1990) provided some description of individuals who may have possessed organizational skills consistent with Phase-II clas-

sification. The individuals who may have possessed greater organizational skills as described by Adler and Adler consisted of drug-dependent individuals. The ability of individuals in Phase I to develop into Phase-II smugglers is expected in this, a developmental model.

Within the Phase-II classification, there are organizations that will contract with mules to transport contraband. More often than not, Phase-II members use methods that require being outside of U.S. territory for a very short time. Phase-II individuals will begin to be identified by specific occupations of relevance to the group goal. Additionally, Phase-II members are more prone than Phase-I associates to employ violence, including murder, as a method of management. Phase-II members will kidnap law enforcement agents and kill them in a sadistic manner, and will also kill any members who violate group laws. The members in Phase II have a mild risk of being caught smuggling.

The members who constitute the Phase-II classification are likely to have part of their business funds allocated for bribes and will have paid off low-level government employees (i.e., airport managers, bankers, and lawyers). The Phase-II members form enterprises, such as import-export, aviation, construction, or marine businesses, to mask their smuggling. The purpose of the Phase-II business is to provide a legitimate rationale for the movement of goods from the location where the contraband is warehoused (i.e., the Virgin Islands or rural locations in the United States) to the retail distribution locations. In this scenario, the contraband is hidden in the goods being transported. Phase-II companies may conduct business for 3 to 5 years before coming to the attention of the government. The Phase-II employees focus on smuggling drugs and other contraband, but will also sell contraband at the street level. It is possible for a Phase-II

company to become legitimate. That is, the Phase-II company may become soluble without relying on the profit from the smuggling operation.

Phase-II group members tend to be antisocial, have family problems, and have difficulty holding jobs. Associates of Phase II engage in alcohol and drug abuse, but will have lower rates of dependency than Phase-I group members. Phase-II individuals are most likely to have a high school diploma and post-high school technical training, or they may have military training. Some Phase-II members may have attended college, but most will not have graduated. A criminal record check on a member of a Phase-II association will reveal misdemeanors, assaults, domestic violence, and some issues with deceptive business practices. Phase-II members who have served in the military typically have documented rule infractions.

Behavioral Characteristics of Phase III

Individuals and organizations in Phase III have extensive experience with smuggling and have long had the specific desire to be smugglers. Phase-III organizations formulate a business plan specifically to engage in the transportation of contraband. Phase-III organizations form associations for the sole purpose of smuggling, and associations among members only occur to the extent that it assists in the ongoing enterprise. The psychodynamics (reasons for smuggling) associated with smugglers change based on the smuggler's geopolitical environment, in addition to the issue of individual neurological behavior and dyscontrol syndrome (Turco, 1990).

Data derived from the subject interviewed was in concert with the experience of a former government inspector in that both advised that the psychodynamics of the smuggler's family must be considered in the DSM theory. Specifically, data gathered during this study found that it is common for Phase-III smugglers at the top man-

agement level to have been exposed since childhood to a family environment in which family members (aunts, uncles, cousins, and siblings) engaged in smuggling. Therefore, at the Phase-III level, there are families in which there are second, third, or more generations in which smuggling is considered acceptable. Thus, smuggling behavior is a family norm.

The DSM theory highlights the importance of cultural relativity. Both the smuggler and the U.S. Customs supervisor interviewed for this study considered the culture in which the smuggling network operates to be critical. Both the smuggler and the customs inspector advised that the extent to which the culture accepts or supports the smuggling can either facilitate law enforcement or enable the smuggler. For example, it was reported by a former U. S. Customs inspector that there is a patron saint of smuggling (Jesus Malverde) in Mexico. The subject of this study advised that he had attended business meetings with Phase-III individuals who felt that, rather than engaging in unacceptable behavior, they were merely taking part in a business arrangement based on the customs of the country (i.e., Colombia, Mexico) or the ways of the traditional family business.

When Phase-III individuals and organizations are examined, their behavior is different from the expected behavior of executives in a legitimate Fortune® 500 company. For example, individuals at the upper level of a Phase-III corporation will use intimidation, extortion, and murder as a part of their business plan and will think nothing of reprisals against individuals and their families. It should also be noted that management will attempt to misdirect their employees and shield them from illegal activity. Although they may present themselves as mere businessmen in very profitable businesses, the psychodynamics show that this is simply not the case. The economics within

Phase III, as well as the power structure of the country in which the smuggler was born and operates, must be taken into account (Emizet, 1995; Ka, 1994; Molina, 1996). One advantage of the DSM model is that it allows for consideration of specific smuggling behavior at an organizational level. One law enforcement individual suggested that, given the DSM theory of the structure of Phase-III organizations, an opportunity for intervention is evident. Specifically, not unlike a Fortune 500 company, when there is a change or weakness in leadership, the organization is in an adjustment period and is vulnerable to attack.

The extent to which the smuggler will seek to achieve legitimization of his or her activities and wealth is an important identity factor among Phase-III smugglers (Molina, 1996). A concrete example of this phenomenon is the report generated by the smuggler interviewed alleging that drug cartel leaders compare themselves to Joseph Kennedy, the father of the late President John F. Kennedy. The cartel leaders allege that Joseph Kennedy was a smuggler just like them, and that just as Joseph Kennedy's children became legitimate political figures in the United States, so too will their children become political figures in their own countries.

The Phase-III smuggler deals with a variety of ethnic groups (i.e., cocaine from Colombia, heroin from Pakistan). This smuggler may offer to purchase products to ship or may serve as a consultant for the smuggling of the producer's product. At this juncture, the smuggler may offer assistance with a variety of contraband (i.e., illegal immigrants, weapons, chemicals necessary for processing drugs). The Phase-III smuggler is of value, as his network is necessary if substantial amounts of contraband are to be reliably transported. The major advantage of the Phase-III smuggler and organization is their expertise in cultural relativity (Adler & Adler, 1993). This point is evidenced

by the Phase-III organization's ability to work with one tightly knit ethnic group located in one country (drug producers in Colombia) and then with another group in another country (wholesale drug buyers in America or Europe). Although ethnic groups, such as specific drug producers, have attempted to smuggle their own product, the expertise of the Phase-III smuggler is required to successfully smuggle substantial amounts of the product from one country to another over an extended period of time.

The Phase-III organization is likely to have set up a multi-national corporation that will have multiple offices in numerous countries on several continents. The review of intelligence records in this case study indicated that the subject had business stops on two continents and in four countries, not counting stops in the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas (DEA File #G8-84-003, memo from SEC-Chicago to Director FBI OG 12-D-110). The subject of this study was employed to transport drugs from one country (Colombia) and then fly them to another country (Freeport, Bahamas) to be warehoused, and then move them to the purchasing countries (United States and Europe). The shipping of contraband entailed flying commercial and private aircraft, as well as piloting commercial ships and private boats. An important point to be made in the smuggling operation is that not only are exotic mechanisms and techniques employed for transporting the contraband, but also for counterintelligence purposes. For example, it would not be uncommon for the Phase-III smuggling operation to study the location of helicopters used by U.S. law enforcement or Department of Defense interdiction units, and then gain access to the maintenance schedules so the Phase-III organization would know when an interdiction or patrol flight was imminent. Phase-III organizations will order counterintelligence opera-

tions to plan misdirection, such as requiring the airplanes that are "ditched" in states such as Louisiana to have material that has been purposefully left on board to throw off law enforcement agencies. For example, maps are left behind with pinpricks or circled areas indicating areas the smugglers do not use or where a competing organization may operate. Additional techniques include the employment of electronic experts to go over smuggling equipment and vehicles to determine if law enforcement has planted tracking or recording devices. It is unlikely that one of the Phase-III group offices will be located near a drug-producing region of a country; however, it will be within flying distance. The multi-national company will not give any outward indication that it is a smuggling operation. It is likely to be an import-export, aviation, or construction business. It will be international and very complex, and is likely to involve moving equipment around the world. It will be very difficult to discover who owns stock in the company and who is on the board of directors.

The smuggling organization consists of department heads. It is not uncommon for one department to address issues involved with warehousing the drugs, another to address security for both the drugs and the personnel (security clearances), and another to address counterintelligence (i.e., gathering data on the locations of U.S. Customs interdiction staff and equipment). Other departments manage the complexities of cash laundering and investments, and some are needed to manage bribes which include, but are not limited to: police, military, customs, airport and seaport management, political offices, and banks (DEA File #G4-83-2073, G8-84-003). As one Phase-III smuggler advised, "Smuggling is a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week business." In respect to the sophistication of the methods employed in smuggling, one former U.S. Customs inspector reported that

he had heard that high-tech night vision gear had been retrieved from a smuggling area.

Not unlike a Fortune 500 company, the Phase-III organization may subcontract out part of the smuggling business. There are a whole host of other industries that, although they do not transport contraband, offer related services. The subject and law enforcement personnel interviewed in this study all observed that the packaging of the contraband is important. It is important to observe the packaging, as different types of contraband (i.e. illegal drugs, explosives, weapons) require different treatment to avoid detection. Studying the packaging of contraband will assist in the classification of the smuggling organization. An example is that a smuggling organization transporting explosives or illegal drugs may use a vender who "heat treats" or removes the oxygen from the package. Thus, the package tells the observer how far away, in hours, the smuggling organization is, as the package vender must take into account the amount of time necessary for the molecules of the contraband to permeate the plastic in which it is wrapped. A Phase-III organization may mark the package with a specific symbol (i.e. scorpion) to notify other smugglers who the shipment belongs to. Such notification serves many purposes, one of which is to let the violence associated with the organization and its symbol protect the shipment from theft.

While validating the information provided by the subject in this study, law enforcement personnel were asked if they could verify that the behavior of specific individuals within the U.S. Customs Service is monitored and probed for weaknesses by Phase-III smuggling organizations. One agency, the U.S. Customs Service, advised that the information provided by the subject in this study was accurate in that it is not uncommon for their personnel to be monitored. Such intelligence gathering

by smuggling organizations has led to the development of the Customs Automated Operating System (CAOS), which is employed by the U.S. Customs Service. The CAOS program was designed to randomize the behavior of employees. Through the CAOS program, the behavioral data gathered on individual employees of the U.S. Customs Service by the smuggling organization is neutralized. The CAOS program was designed with an additional purpose: counterintelligence. Through the CAOS program, it is possible for the U.S. Customs Service to study the behavior of individual employees who have been compromised by a smuggling organization. It is evident that the intelligence and counterintelligence procedures employed by the U.S. Customs Service and the Phase-III smuggling organization have reached a highly competitive and technical level.

A hallmark of Phase-III smugglers is their symbiotic relationship with various governments and competing agencies within a given government. It is not uncommon for one government agency to approach the corporate structure (of the smuggling organization) with a business proposition that includes a smuggling program in which smugglers use their resources to assist the requesting governments. A specific example provided by the smuggler interviewed in this study was the flying of secretive boxed cargo, possibly assault weapons, into Latin America for one government that was fighting against another.

A distinguishing characteristic of individuals who have reached a Phase-III level of smuggling is the sophisticated knowledge they possess regarding the techniques that law enforcement officials will employ to attempt to identify them or the organization they work for. In addition, the sophistication of the techniques the smuggler will employ to avoid being detected is noteworthy. An example of this expertise was offered in the study of documents

provided by the DEA under the Freedom of Information Act (File #G8-84-0003 No. 6). The subject in this study had been identified by U.S. Customs and DEA agents. The U.S. agents requested and received a court order to place an electronic tracking device (transponder) on the aircraft that was thought to be on a return trip from the United States back to the country that warehoused the drugs. The need for a court order, as well as the placement of a tracking device, had been anticipated by the smuggling corporation. The smuggler flew the aircraft in question to an alternate country where the aircraft was assessed (swept) by an electronics consultant who was an expert in locating tracking devices. As a result, the smuggling corporation had the advantage of either misdirecting the efforts of law enforcement officials or terminating the efficacy of the tracking device.

When security personnel from the Phase-III organization identify a law enforcement officer who has been spying on the company outside U.S. territory, they may kidnap the agent and hold him or her for an extended period of time as they interrogate the officer to find out what he or she knows about their smuggling business. During this study, the individual interviewed indicated that there are significant cultural differences, dependent upon the country, regarding whether or not it is not permissible to kill a law enforcement officer. In addition, the extent to which the family of a law enforcement officer can be terrorized varies and is dependent on the cultural acceptance of such behavior.

A distinguishing hallmark of the Phase-III organization is that there is discussion within the group about what to do when it becomes apparent that the organization is under surveillance by law enforcement. This is a major difference from Phase-I individuals, who are not likely to be aware of any interdiction until they are arrested. Phase-III smuggling operations consid-

er the geopolitical pressure that can be exerted by countries such as the United States if that country's law enforcement agents or their families are murdered. The Phase-III smuggling organization will make a financial investment in the political arena in an attempt to solicit information about who is being targeted. A Phase-III organization might offer its smuggling services to a government (i.e., make an offer to a government agency to fly secretive cargo shipments of weapons into Latin America) in order to be viewed in a different light in respect to law enforcement interventions. The organization would receive more favorable treatment, such as notification if the DEA was going to break up its smuggling enterprise or if information had been gathered about targeted individuals. All of these Phase-III behaviors are far more sophisticated than what is seen in Phase-I or Phase-II organizations.

Phase-III members have low amounts of drug usage. They are not drug addicts, but are likely to have other addictions. They are likely to have above-average to superior intelligence and fall into two groups: self-made smugglers who moved up through the smuggling ranks or college-educated or military men who have degrees in business and political science or were trained in intelligence or counterintelligence.

Predictions Drawn From the Developmental Smuggling Behavior Model

A test of the validity and reliability of a theoretical model is its ability to predict an outcome—or in this case, a behavior. I was contacted by two separate law firms to complete behavioral analyses on individuals who had violated the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). While conducting these two evaluations, I explored the extent to which the DSM theory can make predictions.

The first case (96 CF 3024) offered behavioral data from local law enforcement, as well as from the DEA's records



Terrorists and Smuggling Organizations

The issue has been raised that a terrorist organization will seek out an arrangement with a Phase-II or Phase-III smuggling organization, not unlike a government subcontract described in this article. The advantage of a terrorist organization employing a professional smuggling organization to move its equipment and people, as well as produce necessary documents, is clear, as the smuggling network is already in place and operates on a daily basis with little or no detection. Additionally, the rationalization or justification of extreme behavior is a common thread that connects the belief systems of terrorist groups and professional smuggling organizations. For example, a smuggling organization whose principle contraband is illegal drugs must justify smuggling addictive substances without concern for the welfare of others. In addition, both organizations view violence as an effective behavior-management technique. Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction between the corporate culture of a smuggling organization and that of a terrorist group. This distinction centers on whether the host upon which both parties depend can be killed. It is to the smuggling organization's advantage that the host stays alive and retains the financial ability to purchase the smuggled products.

One advantage of the DSM theory is that it offers a variety of possible solutions for the management of a terrorist organization's use of smuggling networks. For example, imagine that an intelligence agency identifies a Phase-III smuggling organization. Given the DSM theory, the intelligence agency would most likely begin its search by considering Phase-III smuggling organizations that specialize in, or make a majority of their profits from, smuggling immigrants. This is because the DSM theory suggests that such a smuggling organization has the most experience in selecting the country and location on the border to complete the crossing. Second, incentives for the effective elimination of the terrorist's use of the smuggling network are offered to the Phase-III organization based on the wants and needs of specific individuals in the organization (see Table 1). The DSM theory offers any number of possible incentives, such as allowing the smuggling organization to transfer money into mainstream investments, amnesty for members of the organization, bounties for specific terrorists, and so on. Punishment of individuals and organizations for lack of cooperation or their failure to catch terrorists crossing their territory would also be a consideration.

(File IY97-0004). In this particular case, an individual from Mexico was arrested in Rockford, Illinois. The smuggling operation involved trucking equipment routed from Mexico to Chicago and then dispersed to Rockford. This individual was brought in to solidify the business agreement between the entity in Rockford and the organization providing the contraband. When considered from the vantage point of the DSM theory, the individual's role in the organization, as well as his behavior when evaluated, matched the characteristics of the Phase-II smuggling classification.

The second case (98 CF 738) also involved a foreign national who was interviewed by local law enforcement officials and the DEA upon his arrest in Rockford. The data in this case matched the characteristics of the Phase-I classification. Additional cases should be examined to classify the behavior of smugglers to determine whether they fall into the predicted phases of the DSM theory.

The validity and reliability of the DSM theory for identifying individuals who are involved in smuggling behavior must not only meet the criteria established by the behavioral sciences, but must also meet the criteria set forth by the court system. The court's expressed intention in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, was to switch the trial court's focus from whether the expert's conclusions had garnered a scientific consensus to whether the expert's techniques and methodology were valid (Gatowsky et al., 2001). Thus, if the DSM theory is to identify individuals in the various phases of smuggling organizations and the specific roles the members have within that group, it must meet the four guidelines articulated under the *Daubert* case. The first of these guidelines states that it is important to be able to determine if the model has the false ability to identify the individual as meeting one of the roles in a drug smuggling organization when the individual does not. The second guideline, which is important, is

the error rate—the reference to false positives and false negatives, or a reference to a number or percentage of instances in which a classification procedure led to misclassification. Third, peer review and publication are an important hurdle for the DSM theory. Finally, the DSM theory must have general acceptance with law enforcement agencies and in the court system.

Summary

A known international drug smuggler was studied over the course of a 2-year period. The information gathered in this study was cross-referenced against intelligence and police reports released from federal records. An additional 5 years were spent cross-referencing information from the smuggler against research articles. Further interviews were conducted with the smuggler when he returned to Rockford. Using the variables found and the life/smuggling experiences of the individual

interviewed, a three-phase developmental smuggling model (DSM) was proposed. The research revealed that smuggling operations are, in actuality, a natural developmental process.

The data in this study indicated that the drug “profile” is not considered a serious threat to major smuggling operations. Second, in the drug profile, the physical traits and mannerisms used to identify smugglers are recognized by individuals of the Phase-III classification. Third, the behavioral cues law enforcement officials employ to identify smugglers of the Phase-I and Phase-II classification are often used by members of the Phase-III classification to ensure capture of the Phase-I and Phase-II members, thereby influencing the number of professional smugglers operating while taking the focus off themselves. Phase-III members and organizations find an advantage in the drug courier model in that it allows marginal amounts of drugs to be seized, thus ensuring that major shipments are not identified. In addition, the drug model focuses on Phase-I and Phase-II members and organizations, thus allowing Phase-III members and organizations to thrive.

Additional research is needed to evaluate and code specific behaviors that can be associated with each phase classification. There needs to be an agency collecting the data on individuals based on the variables offered in Table 1. Not unlike Nellis’ (1984) challenge to psychologists, the DSM model requires that psychologically trained individuals gather data to assist law enforcement and intelligence officers in debriefing and interviewing smugglers. It appears that the opportune time to gather such data is after the smuggler has been convicted but before he or she has been sentenced. This time period will allow the psychologist to apply the greatest reward and punishment to smugglers, their families, or their associates and enemies. It is essential that the psychologist interviewing the smuggler be able

to use information from a variety of competing agencies (i.e., U.S. Customs, DEA, CIA, FBI), as it is likely that the smuggler will have contacts in or will have worked for each competing agency, as did the subject in this case study. The smuggler will have relied upon the fact that the competing agencies do not share data, and/or function under different mandates.

Another advantage of the DSM model is that it allows the arresting officer to think beyond the case specifics. That is, the officer can begin to consider where the contraband came from and whether or not the smuggler received assistance from a related smuggling service (i.e., a vender who specializes in placing false bottoms or panels in vehicles). Another consideration

would include how the contraband (e.g. illegal drugs, weapons, or explosives) was packaged. In the event that the arresting officer desires to maintain a case-specific orientation, the DSM theory will still offer the officer a model to determine what type of smuggler his or her prisoner is.

As predicted by the DSM theory, there will be little difficulty studying Phase-I members. Phase-II members will be less likely to cooperate, unless it is to their advantage. To gain the cooperation of Phase-II members, competing federal agencies must be willing to share behavioral data. One of the clear findings of this case study was that the reluctance of the various U.S. government employees to cooperate is both anticipated and exploited

Table 1	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Intelligence	More variability, low-average to average full scale IQ.	Average to above-average full scale IQ.	Average to superior full scale IQ.
Education	High school drop-out due to behavior disorders; some college.	Most graduate high school, obtain GED, possible technical training in military or technical school.	High School graduate, attended college courses, some have college degrees, and/or have worked up through the smuggling ranks through a calibrated nepotistic pecking order of power and control.
Criminal Record Check	Misdemeanor, battery, disorderly conduct, juvenile record, DUI.	Misdemeanor, assault, domestic violence, deceptive business practices, military record, disorderly conduct.	Domestic violence, deceptive business practices, most likely no file.
Personality Test	MMPI ¹ validity/reliability F>, K<, L>	MMPI validity/reliability F>, K<, L>	MMPI validity/reliability F<, K>, L>
MMPI Clinical Scales	AAS> APS> MAC-R> Scale 2 sig> Scale 4> (A)> (Do)< (ANG)>(CYN)> (FAM)> (WRK)> (ASP)sig>	AASsig> APS> MAC-R> Scale 4 sig> Scale 9>(A)>(Do)sig> (ANG)sig>(CYN)> (FAM)> (WRK)> (ASP)sig>	AAS> APS>sig MAC-R> Scale 4sig> Scale 9< Scale 6sig moderate score
MMPI (Magargee & Bohn)	Type H	Type G	Type A
PAI²	ALGsig> DRGsig> ANX> DEPsig> AGG> ANT> PAR (hypervig rsntment) DOM< WARM> borderline, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability.	ALC> DRG> ANX> DEP> AGGsig> ANTsig> PAR> (hypervig. rsntment) DOM>< WARM>< borderline, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability.	ALC> DRG><, ANX> DEP> (physical only) PARsig> (hypervig. pers cutn, rsntment) DOMsig> WORMsig< borderline, no self-harm, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability.

by members and organizations of the Phase-III classification. Phase-III smugglers develop into elusive individuals and organizations who are the most difficult to evaluate, as they have nothing to lose and everything to gain through non-cooperation.

As a means of evaluating the predictive ability of the DSM theory, I reviewed two cases involving drug smuggling. In one case (96 CF 3024), the individual maintained that he was illiterate, uneducated, and had no business sense. He insisted that a misunderstanding caused him to find himself in an unfortunate situation in a hotel room with a DEA agent, confidential informant, and local police. However, the behavioral data indicated that this was not the case. The individual clearly fit the characteristics of someone in a middle-management position from a drug distribution center located in Mexico, who was in the United States to solidify the shipping and receiving of contraband by a Phase-II smuggling organization. Thus, the usual drug profile did not address this individual's role in smuggling drugs into the United States.

In the second case (98 CF 738), another arrested foreign national maintained that he had very poor reading and writing abilities and was merely caught up in an unlucky situation that involved holding contraband in the garage attached to his house. By cross-referencing the behavioral data, it was discovered that this individual was sophisticated enough to use a false identity and to obtain medical treatment at a local hospital under this alias. This individual's behavior matched with what would be predicted from the DSM theory of an individual in a developing Phase-I smuggling organization. These particular individuals had begun to have specific jobs within the organization. The specific job of the individuals in this case was to warehouse the contraband. The advantage of the DSM theory is that, should the

patterns predicted by the theory be substantiated by further data analysis across scores of smuggling cases, law enforcement will have the means to identify the phase in which the smuggling oper-

ation falls and the expected behavior of the individual or organization.

The DSM model presented in this article offers law enforcement agencies the opportunity to move beyond the

Table 1 (continued)	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Carlson Psych. Survey	Type 5 or 1	Type 7	Type 11 or 6
MCMII III³	Dependent, antisocial, aggressive, sadistic, compulsive, self-defeating, anxiety, alcohol, drug use, borderline.	Antisocial (moderate), aggressive, sadistic (medium-high), borderline, anxiety, alcohol abuse and drug abuse (not dependency).	Antisocial (high), aggressive, sadistic (high), paranoid, alcohol and drug use (low), desirability gauge significantly elevated.
Group Structure	Not stable, short term.	Will not last more than 3-5 years, can deal drugs as well as smuggle.	Long term, will last, do own job only, no drug dealing.
Group Dynamics	Do not need crime to be in a group; many people involved, most friends, some family.	Need crime to be in a group, more people in group, greatest trust with same culture members, most trust family.	Need crime to be in group and must continue crime to remain trusted; most people in group trust family, distrust other cultural groups.
Finances	No bank accounts.	Small, local corporations, bank accounts.	Large, multinational corporations, numerous banks, large wire transactions, look for money held in executive-type banking accounts, will use very established banks.
Use of Violence	Low use of goal-directed violence, murder of law enforcement and other members low, likely to be a shoot-out situation if law enforcement killed, mules will have been caught with drugs and panicked.	Will use violence, including murder, as method of management, will kill law enforcement, attempt to control through violence, likely to kidnap and kill law enforcement, will sadistically "burn" officer if he is caught spying on group, will mule but prefers not to, may send for interrogator before killing law enforcement officer, if possible, will hold for short period of time.	Violence is employed to manage employees and for punishment, will kill law enforcement as a rule, use sadistic violence, usually order low echelon employee to do murder, however, murder is not considered the only solution to problems, will try other means of influence first, will kidnap and then "debrief" law enforcement before brutally killing, have ability to hold officer/agent for extended period of time.
Smuggler Model Type	Only previous model available is "Courier," tend to mule drugs.	No model available for employees, use of drug courier for some ethnic producers.	No model available, drug courier used as pawn only.
Probability of Being Caught	Most likely to be caught.	Mild risk for being caught.	Mild to negligible risk for being caught, if caught likely to be related to money issues.
Bribes, Payoffs	None.	Low level government employees, airport managers, lawyers, bankers.	High level military, law enforcement, politicians, own airports and corporations; when transporting contraband will bribe customs, police, military aware of movement and assist.

concept of the drug profile. The DSM theory suggests that examining a smuggling operation in terms of the specific behavioral characteristics in Phase I, II, or III will have direct implications for targeting and arresting individuals involved in smuggling. For example, individuals involved in a Phase-I smuggling organization are unlikely to have sophisticated record keeping. Conversely, individuals involved in Phase-II organizations, by necessity, need a means of keeping track of the cash, payroll, equipment, etc. Thus, in terms of consideration for interventions such as court orders, knowing the appropriate level (phase) of the organization would offer a distinct advantage for law enforcement. In addition, when the court understands the classification or phase of smuggling involved in a case (rather than focusing on the specific individual who had the contraband), the entire picture or gestalt of the defendant's criminal activity becomes apparent. A measurement of the difference between Phase-I, Phase-II, and Phase-III organizations is evident in the extent to which the organization has invested resources in monitoring law enforcement activities.

The normative data from the different smuggling types in the different classifications of the DSM should be coded into a behavioral database. Smuggler types should be developed, just as arson types are in the *Criminal Classification Manual*. Once this is accomplished, the arguments presented by Young (1991) and Bernstein (1990) will have been addressed.

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