Evil Twins
THE CRIME-TEOR NEXUS

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This article explores the symbiotic relationship between organized crime and terrorist organizations including when there is evidence that such relationships have become indistinguishable. The authors examine the symbiotic relationships detected within the United States of America and other areas of the world. Both groups focus on cigarette diversion, narcotics, and illegal immigrant smuggling. Specific groups such as Hezbollah, the Irish Republican Army, and other crime-terror organizations are used to illustrate these collaborations. This article outlines tools that can be used to identify crime-terror nexus points. Recommendations derived from the importance of using multi-agency working groups coupled with the emerging importance of forensic examiners in the fight against the crime-terror nexus are offered.

Introduction
“They wouldn’t be if I had enough money and explosives.”
—Ramzi Yousef, Terrorist

When the FBI transported Ramzi Yousef by helicopter over Manhattan following his capture for the 1995 bombing of the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers, an FBI agent pulled up Yousef’s blindfold and pointed out that the lights of the World Trade Center were still glowing. “They’re still standing,” the FBI agent stated. Yousef is reported to have responded, “They wouldn’t be if I had enough money and explosives” (Dickey, 2009).

The problems of organized crime and terrorism were often considered separate phenomena prior to 9/11 (Shelley, n.d.). Security studies, the military, and law enforcement seminars discussed the emerging threat of transnational organized crime or terrorism, but the important links between the two were rarely made. Part of the reason for the lack of linkage may be due to the fact that organized crime and terrorism are usually viewed as two different forms of crime. Organized crime’s main focus is economic profit, while terrorism is said to be motivated by ideological aims and a desire for political change (Bovenkerk & Chakra, n.d.). Not connecting the two organizations may be realistic given that Yousef indicated that the lack of financial and logistical support prevented him from running a high-scale terrorist operation with a bigger bomb than what he had used in 1993 (Levitt, 2002).

Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline in state sponsorship for terrorism, while building on the precedent set by narco-terrorism as it emerged in the 1980s in Latin America, the use and imitation of organized crime tactics has been an important factor as methods to produce revenue for terrorist groups. Consequently, the 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime-terror nexus was consolidated and the two separate organizations identifiable by their distinct motives began to reveal operational and organizational similarities (Makarenko, 2004). In fact, organized crime and terrorism appear to be learning from one another and adapting to each other’s successes and failures (Makarenko, 2004). Yet as the above quote illustrates, September 11th has changed how nations view the inter-relationship between these organizations, especially since terrorist groups now use the services of organized crime to assist their activities, and terrorists themselves engage in organized crime activities to support themselves financially.

For example, both organizations operate on network structures that, at times, intersect, such as using smuggling and other illicit means to raise cash and then employ similar fraud schemes to move their funds. According to Robert Charles, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Transnational crime is converging with the terrorist world (Kaplan, Fang & Sangwan, 2005). These authors quote Vindino from his book on al Qaeda, “Crime is now the main source of cash for Islamic radicals.” According to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), nearly half of the 41 groups on the government’s list of terrorist organizations have ties to organized narcotics trafficking syndicates (Lormel, 2002). This statistic does not include other types of trafficking such as human or alien smuggling.

The authors caution, however, that the link between these groups, although evident, is not always clear. The problem may be partly due to the fact that there are different types of organized crime and terrorists groups. There are organized crime groups that use violence or the threat thereof to commit extortion to enforce “business agreements” where the state fails partially or completely from enforcing contracts such as in Sicily and the former Soviet Republic (Bovenkerk et al., n.d.). Then, there is the type of organized crime that would rather operate clandestinely to smuggle narcotics or people and avoid contact with the authorities.
Although terrorist groups have a common goal of frightening people by using extreme violence in their efforts to influence political developments, studies of terrorist groups and their activities tend to support the position that their differences may be equal to or more than their similarities (Cronin, 2002). Despite the fact that the nuances between these groups and their relationships may not be precisely defined, the authors believe that the war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against organized crime. The fight against terrorism is being undermined by a critical lack of awareness about terrorists’ links with organized crime, and crime analysis must be central to understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior. Criminal analysis cannot be viewed as a peripheral issue.

In this article the authors examine factors that make collaboration more likely, case studies illustrating the interaction, tools available to identify where there may be an overlap between these groups, how legitimate organizations may be directly involved in terrorist funding, and recommendations for professionals involved in the detection of these two groups working together.

Identifying Crime-Terror Interaction

“They’re not al-Qaeda, they’re just a Mafia.”
—Majib Benhamiche, Algerian Militiaman

Organized crime groups and terrorists function where the control of the central state is least and where there are porous borders and ineffective law enforcement. For example, terrorists in Europe are engaging in human smuggling both with and without the help of organized crime—especially in Sicily. Italian authorities suspect that one gang of terrorists made over 30 landings in Sicily and moved thousands of people across the Mediterranean at some $4,000 per head (Kaplan, Fang & Sangwan, 2005). The national news story included a statement from a retired FBI official: “I am aware of a high-level Mafia figure, who was cooperating with authorities, being asked if the Mafia would assist terrorists in smuggling people into Europe through Italy...The retired agent is reported to have advised that he understood the high-level Mafia boss to have said, ‘The Mafia will help whoever can pay’” (Stuart, 2006).

In fact, al-Qaeda has been using the Naples-based Camorra Mafia for expertise in forging documents, extensive networks, and to move al-Qaeda operatives through Europe to safe houses (Chepsiuk, 2007). According to Italy’s political crimes unit, the number of al-Qaeda operatives passing through Naples many have exceeded a thousand. If Camorra should experience any problems, they will send the operatives off on one of the many trains leaving the city or via speed boats that Camorra uses to traffic drugs, cigarettes and other contraband. The Camorra al-Qaeda alliance is just one of many examples where the distinct line between organized crime and terrorism has blurred rapidly.

Others provide the home base for terrorist groups where a cooperative or even symbiotic relationship exists between the crime group and the terrorist group operating within the region. Our research indicates that organized crime tends to flourish most when groups in society see their own interests as separate from that of the system of government and the norms promulgated from that system. They flourish where the law enforcement standards are low and there is limited respect...
for legal authority. They also flourish where local law enforcement cannot successfully police ethnic sub-communities within the predominant community.

In conflict zones and certain urban areas, for example, criminals are less constrained by respect for political systems and the rule of law, less intimidated by regulation and law enforcement, and are often motivated by a desire to subvert or disregard the established order. Organized crime is also growing in the heart of many major cities, in penal institutions, and in democratic societies where sub-groups do not share the norms of the larger society. It is not just terrorists who benefit from adopting tactics from organized crime; cooperation with terrorists and adoption of their tactics may benefit organized crime by destabilizing the political structure, undermining law enforcement and limiting the possibilities for international cooperation so that they can maximize their profits (Makarenko, 2004). For example, traditional Mafia groups learned to use the magnifying glass of symbolic violence to reach a wider audience when the Sicilian Mafia executed a series of car bombings in the Italian mainland, specifically Rome and Florence, in the early 1990s (Makarenko, 2009). The goal was to intimidate the public by openly challenging the political structure so that Parliament would renounce the anti-Mafia legislation.

Patterns of criminal behavior generated overseas are transferred to the United States through U.S.-based cells of foreign terror groups—and tend to persist once transferred. For example, Hezbollah involvement in cigarette trafficking was observed first in Latin America then subsequently prosecuted in North Carolina. Chechen terrorists’ involvement in the sex trade industry in Russia has been noted by Los Angeles law enforcement. In developing countries, criminals and terrorists tend to spawn more collaborative relationships that are closer knit. In the developed world, organized crime is more likely to coexist with terrorism at arm’s length through business transactions. Some terrorists have benefited from the participation of legitimate businesses and some of the most serious terrorism cases detected have not involved organized crime groups at all—the terrorists have acted alone using the methods of organized crime. Similarly, a terror group may traffic drugs to fund its violence campaign, but it remains first and foremost a terrorist organization.

While the motives of terrorists and organized criminals often differ, our research indicates this is not always the case, and such a general approach has become too restrictive and can be misleading since the interactions between terrorism and organized crime is complex. The question becomes, “How do we take this complexity and organize data to quickly identify interaction between these two groups?” The approach developed by Shelley, which is briefly summarized below, is derived from a standard intelligence analytical framework and has already proven its utility in law enforcement investigations by analyzing the points of convergence between organized criminals and terrorists to draw useful conclusions for investigators.

Using this approach, the next stage for investigators is to organize all available information and data about a crime-terrorist link. Acknowledging that almost all investigators have access to data, but lack effective means to analyze it, a more efficient methodology is needed to eliminate irrelevant avenues of inquiry and use limited resources more prudently. Drawing on a military intelligence method called Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), the proposed method, Preparation of the Investigation Environment (PIE), allows investigators to identify the areas where terrorism and organized crime are most likely to interact. Such areas are expressed not only in geographic but in circumstantial terms as well. For example, the report identifies the way groups organize themselves, communicate, use technology, employ their members and share cultural affinities as points for overlap. Within each of these areas, we attempt to identify watch points where investigators can then recognize specific indicators that suggest whether or not cooperation between known terrorists and a specific criminal group is actually taking place.

The goal of PIE is similar to that of IPB—to provide investigators and analysts a strategic analytical method to identify areas ripe for locating terror and crime interactions, confirming their existence, and then assessing the consequences of these collaborations. Indicators within watch points assist analysts in looking for data that suggests tangible crime-terror interactions, such as communications between a known criminal and a known terrorist. As analysts and investigators undertake the construction of a case, they can use PIE to frame further investigation in a way that assesses the data, either confirming that collaboration exists or dismissing the data.

The PIE methodology shows how insights can be gained from analysts to help practitioners identify problems and organize their investigations more effectively. Rather than simply organizing data more efficiently, investigators need analytic techniques that help reduce the time spent locating potential interactions and better focus their activities on the most relevant evidence about terror and crime groups. The application of PIE is an efficient tool for analyzing the behavior of criminal and terrorist groups because it focuses on evidence about their operational behavior as well as the environment in which they operate. The evidence is plentiful: communications, financial transactions, organizational forms, and behavioral patterns can all be analyzed using a form of IPB. By identifying watch points of crime-terror collaboration potential, the goal is to generate intelligence for the development of early warning on planned terrorist activity.

The Theoretical Basis for the PIE Method

Shelley cites Donald Cressey’s study of organized crime in the United States, drawing upon the analogy of an archeological dig as the starting point for the model of crime-terror cooperation. As Cressey analogized the scenario, archeologists first examine documentary sources to collect existing knowledge and use it to develop a map. That map allows the investigator to focus on the unknown areas—that is, the archeologist uses the map to focus on where to dig. The map also serves as a context within which artifacts discovered during the dig can be evaluated for their significance. For example, discovery of a bowl at a certain depth and location can provide information to the investigator concerning the date of an encampment and who established it.

An important reason to collect data about the interactions between criminal and terrorist groups is to provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies with actionable information. This data, organized with the help of PIE, helps reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, focuses investigations, reduces time wasted by analysts reviewing useless information, improves warning time, and reveals vulnerabilities by identifying watch points.
Adapting the three components of IPB to PIE, the organizational composition of criminal and terrorist networks, the environment where they meet, and the behavioral patterns of each group, the combination of these three components results in a series of watch points, or areas where analysts and investigators might find crime-terror cooperation.

Crime-terror connections are more likely to occur in areas of the world where the state has little presence and means of control, which is often exemplified by shadow economies, corruption, and regional conflicts. Territory outside the control of the central state, which is seen in failed or failing states; poorly regulated or border regions (especially those regions surrounding the intersection of multiple borders); and parts of otherwise viable states where law and order is absent or compromised, including urban quarters populated by diaspora communities or penal institutions; are favored locations for crime-terror interactions.

**Application of the PIE Approach: The Republic of Georgia**

The first application of PIE, according to Shelley, focused on the Republic of Georgia to identify a specific crime-terror interaction—namely money laundering. The ability to organize financial records from a major money launderer allowed the construction of a significant network that allowed understanding of the linkages among major criminal groups whose relationship has not been previously acknowledged. The PIE approach provided Georgia—a country with limited expertise in transnational crime, terrorism or money laundering—the possibility to achieve a successful prosecution and to assist other countries identified through subsequent network analysis to receive significant assistance in their investigations.

A preliminary analysis applied information to the PIE watch points and found strong evidence to suggest crime-terror interactions could be operating in or facilitated by operations within the Republic of Georgia. Some of the most relevant information to Georgia included but was not limited to: 1) corrupt Georgian officials held high law enforcement positions prior to the Rose Revolution and maintained ties to crime and terror groups that allowed them to operate with impunity; 2) similar patterns of violence were found among organized crime and terrorist groups operating in Georgia; 3) numerous banks, corrupt officials, and other providers of illicit goods and services assisted both organized crime and terrorists; and 4) regions of the country supported criminal infrastructures useful to organized crime and terrorists alike, including Abkhazia, Adjaria, and Ossetia.

If the interaction between the pieces of information triggered an indication that would warrant further exploration, the next step would be to determine what would be the watch points to examine for patterns of interactions between crime-terror groups. Combined with numerous other pieces of information and placed into the PIE watch point structure, the resulting analysis triggered a sufficient number of indicators to suggest that further analysis was warranted to attempt to locate a crime-terror interaction. An analysis of the watch points examined suggested that the financial environment would facilitate the link between crime and terrorism—specifically money laundering.

Numerous banks had developed within Georgia, a country that has a huge shadow economy coupled with a decline of the Georgian economy at the time of the analysis. This would indicate that there was not enough business to support several banking institutions. Consequently, within the context of specific PIE watch points, a bank would appear suspicious if it was small, had few commercial clients, yet appeared to be doing a very significant volume of transactions when other banks were struggling economically. A six-month analysis of such a bank and its transactions enabled the development of a massive network analysis that facilitated prosecution in Georgia. Using PIE allowed a major intelligence breakthrough by locating a large facilitator of dirty money, identifying connections between crime and terror groups, and revealing the enormous role that purely “dirty banks” housed in countries with small economies can provide as a service for transnational crime and terrorism. It was learned that the Georgian bank serviced a Russian crime group with links to South American terror groups. Moreover, the analysis illustrates the importance for U.S. investigators and analysts to look overseas for sites of crime-terror operations that could come to our shores.

**The Crime-Terror Interplay with Cigarette Smuggling**

It is not surprising that terrorist cells within the United States have used cigarette smuggling as a method to fund their operations. Specifically large quantities of cigarettes are sold on the black market at below retail cost by avoiding paying tobacco tax rates or by paying lower tax rates in certain states. For example, the information regarding the Mohamad Hammoud Terrorist Cell and the Hassan Moussa Makki Terrorist Cell was taken from a congressional senate report from September 11, 2007, addressing the issue of cigarette trafficking. The Hammoud business model involved moving large amounts of cigarettes across state lines, where they would be sold for a substantial profit in states with higher tobacco tax rates. In North Carolina, where they purchased the cigarettes, the tax was 50 cents per carton. They would then load the cigarettes onto large trucks and vans and drive them to Michigan, where they would sell them to local convenience store owners.

In Michigan, the tax was $7.50 per carton, but those taxes were never paid. By avoiding Michigan’s tobacco tax, it is estimated that these individuals were able to make anywhere from $3,000 to $10,000 on each trip. According to court documents, “the conspiracy involved a quantity of cigarettes valued at roughly $7.5 million and that the state of Michigan was deprived of $3 million in tax revenues.” Hammoud transferred funds generated by the cigarette trafficking scheme, as well as money raised from other sources, back to Lebanon to support Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization. That support included cash and dual-use equipment, such as night vision goggles, high-end computers, ultrasonic dog repellents, and global positioning systems.

In September 2003, Hassan Moussa Makki pleaded guilty to charges of cigarette smuggling, racketeering, and providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. From 1996 to 2002, Makki and his co-conspirators would obtain low-tax cigarettes from the Cattaraugus Indian Reservation in New York and North Carolina and sell them for a substantial profit in Detroit. According to the ATF, Hassan Makki was trafficking between $36,000 and $72,000 of contraband cigarettes per month between 1997 and 1999. It was later discovered that one of Makki’s sources for cheap cigarettes was Hammoud’s North Carolina smuggling ring. Like Hammoud, Makki would then remit the proceeds from these illegal tobacco sales to Hezbollah. This is only one example of a vast, interstate conspiracy engaged in cigarette smuggling operations inside the United States.
The next case involves a for-profit corporation that was caught, but not convicted of, aiding terrorist organizations. This case reached national attention when a number of foreign governments referred to as the European Union (EU), filed a lawsuit against RJ Reynolds Nabisco, the parent company of RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR), alleging money laundering activities conducted by RJR during cigarette diversion smuggling operations. Because RJR could not directly market and sell their cigarettes in Iraq, they bypassed the restriction by using a Cyprus-based company to sell in Iraq. This case was not investigated by U.S. law enforcement but was the result of long-term investigations by the EU, who presented in U.S. court significant evidence that a major American company had violated both U.S. law and the UN embargo on sales to Iraq and had done this with the complicity of a recognized terrorist organization (Shelley & Melzer, 2008). The RJR case illustrates that the behavior defined as organized crime is not necessarily restricted to commonly known organized crime groups. The smuggling was accomplished by other illegal acts such as document fraud, false invoicing, and money laundering. RJR even paid protection money to a terrorist group to achieve their large volume of sales (Shelley & Melzer, 2008).

Legitimate businesses that decide to conspire with crime-terror links should be aware that such liaisons are risky. The authors caution that it should come as no surprise that corporate employee deaths may result from the interaction between legitimate businesses and crime-terror groups, especially if there are fraud detection issues a forensic examiner may disclose so that accomplices (crime-terror links) are not revealed (Perri & Lichtenwald, 2007, 2008). Fraud detection homicide is not uncommon, and white collar criminals who engage in fraud will kill co-workers who may be tempted to disclose their fraudulent and conspiratorial behaviors. Interestingly, these white collar criminals who do kill appear to have the same personality disorder of psychopathy as many of the crime-terror individuals they assist; they do not hesitate to kill those who interfere with their schemes (Perri & Lichtenwald, 2007, 2008). Conversely, it would be possible for a corporate employee to be killed by crime-terror groups that do not want what appears to be a legitimate corporate employee who is conspiring with them to cooperate with authorities and reveal their plans and identities.

The RJR case illustrates that a legitimate business can function in ways that are similar to a criminal organization. The corporation committed wire fraud, produced fraudulent documents, evaded taxes, deliberately violated trade embargoes, cooperated with identified terrorists to increase profit and market share—traits that are not different from other organized crime entities. In many respects the cost-benefit analysis to corporations makes their association with terrorist appear riskless because the probability of criminal or civil prosecutions is so low and the monetary returns are enormous. Unfortunately, the failure to punish corporations such as RJR only encourages other corporations to engage in similar behavior while further exposing the United States and our allies to terrorist attacks. It appears that corporations must police themselves because the U.S. government has failed to back decisive action against cigarette smuggling; “The failure to address cigarette smuggling in a comprehensive manner is part of a larger failure of most American law enforcement to address the links between crime and terrorism” (Shelley & Melzer, 2009).

The Lebanese-Mexican Symbiotic Smuggling Network
Salim Boughader Mucharrafille, a Mexican of Lebanese descent, was owner of Cafe La Libanesa in Tijuana, Mexico, catering to customers of some of Tijuana’s more affluent citizens, including workers at the U.S. Consulate located a short distance away. However, it was not the customers who came to the cafe to dine and socialize that lead to Boughader’s arrest in December 2002. It was his founding and leadership of the Lebanese-Mexican smuggling network that smuggled 200 illegal Lebanese immigrants and an unknown number of whom were sympathetic to, financial supporters of, or linked to known terrorists with Hezbollah. Boughader’s total disregard for any crimes the illegal Lebanese immigrants would commit while hiding in the United States, including his backing of their support for terrorist activities of Hezbollah, was an major problem. “If they had the cedar on their passport, you were going to help them…What’s the crime in bringing your brother so that he can get out of a war zone?” Boughader told The Associated Press from a Mexico City prison, where he faces charges following a human-smuggling conviction in the United States (Arrillaga & Rodriguez, 2005).

Of interest with respect to Shelley’s crime-terror link was that Boughader had no difficulty both structuring and justifying the double deception involved in both the nature of his legitimate business front (cafe) and the justification for the criminal business (smuggling) with links to Hezbollah. In addition, the cafe also allowed a means for money laundering. “For us, Hezbollah are not terrorists,” said Boughader, echoing the feelings of most Lebanese “…I regret that what I was doing is against the law, but I don’t regret what I did to help people.” The statement goes directly to the issue which is for individuals like Boughader and the unknown number of individuals he smuggled into America, the belief that murder committed in the name of Hezbollah (including the murder of the marines stationed in Beirut in 1982) is justified. The treachery is that the very country the Lebanese infiltrated considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and the murders and hate crimes committed by Hezbollah are regarded as a crime. Nevertheless, the Lebanese Boughader smuggled want to live in America with all the rights of citizenship but with none of the responsibilities; for example, not supporting an enemy of America who has as part of his terrorist philosophy the right to murder American citizens.

Another major deception was the cover story offered by Boughader when interviewed by the Associated Press. Boughader attempted to cast himself in the hero role by claiming that his only crime might be helping people who had found their way to his cafe to escape from a war zone in the Middle East. Such statements by smugglers whose contraband is people is suspect and are designed to mislead the listener about the malevolence inherent in human smuggling. Thus, it was no surprise that
those who were smuggled through the Lebanese-Mexican smuggling network were just the reverse of what Boughader claimed. Another reversal of facts presented by Boughader was that contrary to not making a profit, it was only after receiving a large profit up front that he would hand his clients over to organized criminals in Mexico, who did not ask about the background or motives of the Lebanese they were bringing into the U.S. Boughader’s Lebanese-Mexican smuggling network is a clear example of a symbiotic relationship between a criminal organization (Mexican Smugglers) and Boughader, who was running human contraband (Lebanese)—many who were enemies of the United States.

A review of the people who paid Boughader for the use of the Lebanese-Mexican smuggling network offered two examples of Hezbollah supporters. One of the individuals who paid to be smuggled worked for a Hezbollah-owned television network that glorifies suicide bombers. This individual developed propaganda against America during a period in which American soldiers died while serving in the Middle East. In another case, a Lebanese carpenter, Mahmoud Yousef Kourani, who Boughader arranged to be smuggled using the Lebanese-Mexican smuggling network in California, admitted spending part of his time in the United States raising money to support Hezbollah—at least $40,000, according to an FBI affidavit.

However, a further check of court records indicated that Kourani told the FBI his brother is the group’s (Hezbollah) chief of military security in southern Lebanon (Fox News, 2005). Prosecutors alleged the brother directed Kourani’s U.S. activities. Thus, Shelley’s crime-terror link and data imputed in a PIE analysis would show terrorists rich with cultural loyalties and family ties. Again we observe that the criminal-terrorist spectrum includes many people who wish to destroy America while simultaneously claiming the freedom and civil rights as citizens.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is using the same southern narcotics routes that Mexican drug kingpins use to smuggle drugs and people into the United States and reaping money to finance its operations and threatening U.S. national security. The Iran-backed Lebanese group has long been involved in narcotics and human trafficking, and now it is using the U.S. as a transit point to smuggle drugs and people into the United States; Hezbollah relies on “the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels,” said Michael Braun, former assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (Carter, 2009).

“They work together,” Braun said. “They rely on the same shadow facilitators. One way or another, they are all connected. They’ll leverage those relationships to their benefit, to smuggle contraband and humans into the U.S.” (Carter, 2009). His comments were confirmed by six U.S. officials, including law enforcement, defense, and counterterrorism specialists. In October, U.S. and Colombian law enforcement agencies broke up a Hezbollah drug trafficking ring that was funneling profits to markets in Europe, the United States, and militias in Lebanon, according to Department of Justice reports. The ring’s director was Shukri Mahmoud Harb, a money launderer who was arrested with 130 Hezbollah colleagues (Sale, 2009). While Hezbollah appears to view the United States primarily as a source of cash, and there have been no confirmed Hezbollah attacks within the U.S., the group’s growing ties with Mexican drug cartels are particularly worrisome at a time when a war against and among Mexican narco-traffickers has killed thousands of people in the past year and is destabilizing Mexico along the U.S. border (Lichtenwald, Perri & MacKenzie, 2009).

Two U.S. law enforcement officers familiar with counterterrorism operations in the United States and Latin America, said that “it was no surprise” that Hezbollah members have entered the U.S. border through drug cartel transit routes. “The Mexican cartels have no loyalty to anyone…They will willingly or unknowingly aid other nefarious groups into the U.S. through the routes they control” (Gedalyahu, 2009). A senior U.S. defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of ongoing operations in Latin America, said that “it was no surprise” that Hezbollah members have entered the U.S. through drug cartel transit routes. “If I have the money to do it …I want to get somebody across the border—that’s a way to do it…Especially foot soldiers…somebody who’s willing to come and blow themselves up,” according to the defense official (Carter, 2009). Hezbollah smuggles weapons, document traffickers, narcotics, and alien and human contraband along routes used by drug cartels—enlisting Lebanese Shiite expatriates to negotiate contracts with Mexican crime bosses.

The Black Hole Syndrome

Although some terrorist groups maintain the public façade that their goals are political, the evidence no longer supports their statements. No longer driven by political agendas, but rather by the quest for profit, groups that were solely terrorist groups use terror tactics for several reasons. First of all, the terror tactics keep governments and law enforcement officials focused on political issues as opposed to initiating criminal investigations and secondly, terror tactics are a tool these groups use to assert themselves against rival criminal groups (Makarenko, 2004). Groups that illustrate their evolution from a terrorist organization into a group that is primarily engaged in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). There is little indication that Abu Sayyaf remains driven by its original political motive, which was to establish an independent Islamic republic in the territory comprising Mindanao, surrounding islands, and the Sulu Archipelago. In 2000, Abu Sayyaf’s kidnapping deals have brought in about $20 million (Makarenko, 2004). FARC has lost its revolutionary zeal and has turned to the development of criminal cartels; It is believed that FARC controls 40 percent of the Colombian territory (Makarenko, 2004).

The inability to distinguish the two groups may lead to what Makarenko (2004) refers to as the “black hole” syndrome. The black hole syndrome encompasses two situations: first, where the primary motivations of the group engaged in a civil war evolves from a focus on the political aims to a focus on the criminal aims, and secondly, it refers to the emergence of a black hole state—a state that has been successfully taken over by a crime-terror group. Although this position reveals the extreme consequence of the crime-terror nexus ultimately blending into an indistinguishable entity, what is born is a scenario of constant civil or regional wars to secure economic and political power. These types of scenarios are not just theoretical considerations; they exist today in Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and in Pakistan’s Northwest.
Frontier Province. Wars that were originally fought for ideological and religious reasons have morphed into wars that are fought to advance criminal interests secured by terrorist tactics. Today ideological, political, and religious rhetoric is the guise used to secure legitimacy and as a recruiting tool. The Taliban, for example, once an organization of seminary students seeking to establish a caliphate, the Islamic form of government representing the Muslims, embraces Mafia-like activities that feed on insecurity for financial gain (Kunduz, 2009). Together with poor governance, ineffective policing, and a weak justice system, “the nexus between the Taliban and crime has become dangerously entrenched in Afghan society...” the Taliban are acting like a broad network of criminal gangs that enables them to utilize different sources of income” (Kunduz, 2009).

The authors agree with Makarenko (2004) that the country of Afghanistan has the characteristics of a black hole state. Even though the media coverage on the war does not efficiently address the crime-terror nexus and the true motives of those who are trying to take over the country, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the motive for the United States to be involved in the war is to reverse Afghanistan’s black hole condition that gave rise to groups such as al-Qaeda who organized and waged war on the United States. Unfortunately, an obstacle to reversing Afghanistan’s black hole condition is the fact that Afghanistan supplies the world’s opium with the assistance of transnational organized crime groups. The drug trade creates the type of political destabilization that creates weak states; a perfect recipe for the birth of a black hole country. To date, after being at war in Afghanistan for over seven years, there still does not appear to be a centralized authority capable of bringing stability to the country; rather it is a country of drug war lords dividing the country into local fiefdoms.

The authors would extrapolate Makarenko’s thesis of the black hole syndrome to the current crime-terror war that is being waged in Northern Mexico on the border with the United States, which was not as pronounced when Makarenko published her article in 2004. Although Mexico cannot be considered a failed state in technical terms, the narcotics war in Northern Mexico where thousands of people have died in the last two years appears to have the qualities of an emerging black hole region similar to Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. There is evidence that the war in Mexico is spilling over in the United States (Bricker, 2009). It is premature to conclude whether the Mexican government can restore a sense of order to this region of the country or whether the United States will have its own black hole region referred to as the Southwest Frontier Province that overlaps Northern Mexico and the Southwestern U.S. The recent diplomatic talks between the United States and Mexico on how to address this issue cannot have come soon enough; organized crime here has borrowed fear tactics from terrorists including the murder of innocents, police officers, government personnel, beheadings, and torture.

The Irish Republican Army
Islamist terrorist are not the first to resort to organized crime to help fund their operations, and they will not be the last. Both the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the militant splinter group Real IRA have used cigarette smuggling to finance their operations. While both groups seek the unification of the island of Ireland, the Provisional IRA announced in 2005 that it would henceforth use only peaceful means. The Real IRA continues to employ terrorist tactics including robbery, bombings, and assassinations, most recently shooting dead two British soldiers in Northern Ireland in March in order to undo the renunciation of violence by the Provisional IRA. “Cigarette smuggling has definitely been a major source of funding for the Provisional IRA—not only the Real IRA (RIRA)—and other terrorist groups in Northern Ireland,” said Rogelio Alonso Pascual, an IRA expert teaching at Madrid’s Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. In addition to RIRA and the Continuity IRA (CIRA) are committed to unrelenting the Provisional IRA’s renunciation of violence and are not likely to stop in response to public pressure.

The Real IRA has flooded Ireland with contraband cigarettes and imported counterfeit versions of popular brands. Authorities say the group is responsible for nearly all the smuggled tobacco seized in Northern Ireland, and they say cigarette smuggling has emerged as a top funding source for the organization. Combined, the IRA groups reaped an estimated $100 million in proceeds from cigarette smuggling over a five-year period, according to a 2004 report by William Billingslea, an analyst for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Recently, a Miami man was indicted in connection to a cigarette smuggling ring with ties to the Real IRA. The arrest comes after a seven-year investigation stretching from the Canary Islands to Panama, through the port of Miami, and on to Ireland and the UK.

Stratfor Global Intelligence (2009) reports that the IRA consists of four main splinter groups and that each group has specific behaviors that define it. This article asserts that those behaviors could also define each terrorist splinter group as a database set or object. The four groups and the specific behaviors are as follows:

IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY SPLINTER GROUPS
Another crime associated with the IRA is tiger kidnapping, in which criminals take hostage(s) or imply that they have hostage(s) who are typically a target’s family member(s). Tiger kidnappings entail stalking the target, gathering detail intelligence prior to the kidnapping, and then using a hostage scenario to force an employee to bypass an institution’s security system, commit the robbery, and give the money to the kidnappers (Control Risks, 2009). On February 27, 2009, criminals told a bank employee that they were going to kill a 5-year-old child, his mother, and his maternal grandmother unless the bank employee produced money (Pogatchnik, 2009). This instance of a tiger kidnapping has been reported by one source to be related to members of an IRA faction. It is not clear whether it was the RIRA or the CIRA (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2009), but tiger kidnappings have been completed by both IRA terrorist and sophisticated criminal groups (Control Risk, 2009).

The proposed model (upper right) serves as a method for studying terrorist-criminal activities based not only on the dynamics of the individual terrorist cells, but the interaction between the cells—in essence, a social network based on terrorist splinter groups. Social network models allow law enforcement the opportunity to identify individual members of a cell as well as the principal behaviors of the cell such as the type of crimes committed, types of smuggling they engage in and cells that commit fraud, violence as examples. Law enforcement officers will recognize that the model proposed below is simply a method based on what they already do during criminal investigations with one notable
exception, the model is understood to mutate into different types of network structures in response to law enforcement pressure such as when arrests are made on a particular cell, the other cells may change their methods, sources of funding, contingency plans, etc.

For example, like a chess game where it is necessary to think multiple moves ahead, law enforcement must be prepared to anticipate the mutation and strike again before the mutated cells can converge. Conversely, law enforcement’s goal may be that they want the cells to converge after a mutation because they want to track who the criminal and terrorist reach out to in the social network. Nevertheless, forensic examiners specialize in working in the overlapping lines as well as the various organizational structures would not find the areas blurry because they are cognizant that criminals engage in terrorist acts and vice versa.

SOCIAL NETWORK TERROR-ORGANIZED CRIME MODEL

The social networking model might take into account other factors such as the age of the cells members, level of education, personality traits such as callousness that are unique to certain cell memberships, and the presence or absence of a charismatic leadership. This resolves the issue of not being able to distinguish actors in the crime-terror nexus because of the perception that the lines have been blurred between terrorist groups that engage in criminal activities to generate profit and those that do not. The authors propose that the benefit of the analysis of the social networking interactions between different cells is that such analysis identifies and clarifies the players and identifies opportunities for infiltration, disruption and dismantling the cells. The benefit to law enforcement is the flexibility in perceiving who they are investigating which then generates the benefit of removing ambiguity from the nexus. For example, a terrorist who bombs might now be considered a member who also commits fraud. The behaviors that occur in the overlap between the cells illustrated above are part of behavioral science and the evidence (bullets, notes, fiber etc.) are part of crime scene investigations and social networking analysis all of which have made significant breakthroughs since the last time the IRA was active back in the 1998.

The overlapping lines between the different splinter factions in the Terror-Criminal Operations Model illustrated above suggest that different terrorist cells may increase, decrease, or even terminate their overlap, depending on a number of factors, including the personalities and preferences for specific types of crime of the individuals involved in the cell. Although the INLA is considered to be responsible for organized crime to support the IRA, it is possible that an individual CIRA cell may engage in crime to support its individual terrorist cell. Therefore, it is critical that the investigating agency identify which splinter faction has engaged in the criminal activity and begin the forensic process of documenting their findings and tracing both their behavior as well as the money back to the source and vice-versa.

The IRA reactivation offers an opportunity to study organized crime acts run by the same terrorist group: smuggling weapons, tiger kidnappings, and the murder of law enforcement. Thus, there is an opportunity to compare two criminal activities in a “within groups” type of research design for example comparing the criminal methods of the CIRA versus the OIRA or the RIRA versus the OIRA. The cross comparisons between the groups is important. By isolating behavioral patterns, law enforcement will be more apt to identify the group and also strategy to infiltrate, disrupt, and dismantle the group. Also, knowing where the overlap lies between groups assists in determining how to further use the social network to get to the ultimate goal. For example, if the goal was to ultimately infiltrate the OIRA, one method would be to identify a CIRA or RIRA cell that has a social network coming into the OIRA. Keep in mind that in the above example infiltration of the OIRA does not necessarily mean physically being part of the OIRA; it could mean gathering OIRA intelligence from one of the CIRA or RIRA cell.

Moreover, once the data is collected on one terrorist group such as the IRA, it will be possible to begin cross-cultural analysis that is a comparison between two different terrorist groups that engage in smuggling. For example, the data regarding the terror-
ist groups operating in the United States (i.e. cigarette smuggling operation funding Hezbollah) can be compared against the IRA sources and methods. Moreover, once this information is collected, a cross comparison can be made between smuggling organizations that engage in terrorist acts (Cali and Felix drug cartels) and terrorist organizations that engage in smuggling (i.e. Hezbollah and IRA etc.) on a number of variables such as which terrorist organizations use certain types of smuggling techniques, what type of contraband is smuggled, how money is moved, types of weapons used, how their counter intelligence operations work in identifying us, and so on.

The Role of the Forensic Examiner

A myriad of fraud-based crimes, such as financial fraud, tax fraud, wire fraud, mortgage fraud, counterfeiting, identity theft, and document fraud, normally associated with organized crime has been adopted by terrorist with and without the assistance of organized crime. For example, a terrorist organization in Germany attempted to raise about a $1 million from insurance fraud to fund a suicide mission in Iraq (Kaplan, Fang & Sangwan, 2005). Al-Qaeda’s financial network in Europe, dominated by Algerians, is largely reliant on credit card fraud illustrating how these groups have manipulated economic globalization (Makarenko, 2004). According to Collins (2003), “All acts of terrorism enacted against the United States have been facilitated with the use of a fake or stolen identity.” Collins indicates that five percent of all identity thieves are connected to terrorism and two percent, specifically to al-Qaeda. In fact, the al-Qaeda terrorist involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks had opened 14 bank accounts using several different names, all of which were fake or stolen. Terrorists often use stolen or fabricated Social Security numbers, credit cards and passports to create false identities and pay for their operations, FBI officials say.

The blurring of the line between terrorist activities and organized crime presents an excellent opportunity for United States agencies to better identify and dismantle these organizations. Delli-Colli (2006) of ICE believes that financial crimes are a direct threat because they also sustain and support the illicit activities of terrorists. These organizations often resort to white-collar crime tactics to raise cash, launder money, etc.; in many cases, white-collar crimes leave a paper trail that can be used to track people who are involved. Bender (2005) reports that officials say, “Cracking the car theft rings and tracing the cars could help identify the leaders of insurgent forces in Iraq and shut down one of the means they use to attack the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government.” Agencies such as the FBI and ICE, who have forensic financial investigative expertise, could use their skills to combat these organizations. As stated above, one of the power strategies that terrorism enjoys is the clandestine quality of non-delectability: to strike at any moment and disappear. Yet, by partaking in regular crimes, mistakes are made, evidence trails become more apparent, and agencies can capitalize on such mistakes.
In addition, both the Bombay (1993) and Madrid (2008) attacks were not purely terrorist attacks; they also had criminals assisting in the preparation of the attacks. Although the Bombay attacks were reported to be related to terrorist activity, the funding was connected to Dawood Ibrahim (a.k.a. Dawood Ibrahim and Sheikh Dawood Hassan), who is identified as an organized crime figure. He is reported to be an Indian crime lord who has found common cause with al-Qaeda, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamic extremists aimed at destabilizing the Indian government (United State Treasury Department Press Release, October 16, 2003). Some terrorists operate their own criminal activities that may provide forensic analysts with further opportunity to anticipate attacks by focusing on the type of crime that is being used to fund their operations.

For example, if law enforcement knew which criminal activities terrorist cell members were using to obtain money, they would have an opportunity to infiltrate, disrupt, or arrest the cell members for the criminal acts prior to the terrorist acts. The Madrid bombing serves as a case in point because one member of the terrorist group, Jamal Ahmedani, used his skills as a drug smuggler and dealer to obtain explosives. The March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings, consisted of 10 explosions aboard four commuter trains, killing 191 victims from 17 countries. The drug traffickers took charge of obtaining money, weapons, phones, cars, safe houses and Ahmedani rented a rural cottage turning it into a bomb factory while enlisting Spanish jailhouse contacts to arrange the exchange of 66 pounds of hashish for 220 pounds of dynamite stolen from a mine in the Asturias region (Rotella, 2004). The terrorist’s plot behind the Madrid attacks was orchestrated by drug dealers with a network stretching from North Africa to Northern Europe in addition to the investigation uncovering about $2 million in cash and narcotics (Kaplan, 2005).

Identity theft is possibly one of the most lucrative enterprises which terrorists have engaged in, and they get much more than money from this crime. Identity theft facilitates terrorist goals of avoiding watch lists, obscures their whereabouts, assist in terrorist funding activities and gaining unauthorized access to entry points such as airline gates, border crossings, or other facilities (Gartenstein & Dabruzzi, 2007). One critical aspect of identity theft, according to Denis Lormel of the FBI’s Terrorism Review Group, is the “cloak of anonymity” that it provides; identities are often stolen in order to carry out such violations of federal law as bank fraud, credit card fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and computer crimes. Moreover, this cloak of anonymity means that “[t]he use of a stolen identity enhances the chances of success in the commission of almost all financial crimes,” which again enhances the importance of forensic examiners to unravel identity mysteries (Gartenstein & Dabruzzi, 2007). The 9/11 Commission Report established that terrorists have committed identity fraud noting that “travel documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack.”

Counterfeit goods have become another illegal source of revenue for terrorists. The FBI’s 1996 confiscation of 100,000 counterfeit T-shirts that had fake Nike and Olympic insignia organized by the followers of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was sentenced to life in prison for his involvement in a 1995 plot to bomb New York City landmarks (Emerson, 2002). Fake goods range from power tools to “designer” clothes to pharmaceutical products. Stratfor—a leading private intelligence firm that provides corporations, governments, and individuals with geopolitical analysis and forecasts—reports that Hezbollah has even supported past operations by selling knockoff designer products on New York City street corners (Gartenstein & Dabruzzi, 2007).

Recommendations

“Transnational crime will be a defining issue of the 21st century for policymakers—at defining as the Cold War was for the 20th century and colonialism was for the 19th. Terrorists and transnational crime groups will proliferate because these crime groups are major beneficiaries of globalization. They take advantage of increased travel, trade, rapid money movements, telecommunications and computer links, and are well positioned for growth.”

–Louise I. Shelley

During the Cold War, concerns about the crime-terror nexus were relatively insignificant, and it was relegated to insurgent groups in Latin America and regional drug cartels; however, the international environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War together with the fall of the Soviet Union, created conditions that supported the development of criminal and terrorist entities (Makarenko, 2004). The development of these two entities has now resulted in the emergence of transnational organized crime and international networked terrorist groups as exemplified by al-Qaeda with these types of groups creating a state of heightened insecurity within in the world of governments that are accustomed to military threats by known, identifiable state players now forced to react to economic and social destruction perpetrated by unknown non-state players (Makarenko, 2004).

In essence, what is considered a state under attack has been redefined, and the tools used by the state have to be reexamined. What is clear is that the old methods of fighting a new type of war will not work; the enemy has used the new tools of globalization to its benefit, and therefore governments must quickly retool its agencies to fight a new type of war. Just as the crime-terror players use their social networks to advance their goals, the fight cannot be waged solely by the United States. It will take diplomatic international social networking by legitimate governments to pool their resources together to fight this well organized international enemy.

The authors outline some recommendations, however they caution readers that the list is far from exhaustive. They do offer an opportunity to critically examine areas that could be improved with agencies that already examine the crime-terror nexus and those areas that directly facilitate the work of organized crime and terrorists that appears to have fallen by the wayside for political reasons such as immigration reform and the porous border between Mexico and the United States. Growing reliance on cross-border criminal activities, facilitated by open borders, weak states, immigration flows, financial technology, and an intricate and accessible global transportation system, coupled with an interest to establish political control have contributed to the rise of the crime-terror nexus (Makarenko, 2004). In essence, international crime-terror groups are challenging legitimate governments, possibly for the first time in history, because they realize that first of all they have the power to do it now and secondly they realize that economic and political power enhance one another. The rise of hybrid groups as opposed to two distinct
groups is not unforeseeable as outlined in the black hole syndrome and as previously mentioned the current scenarios of Afghanistan and Mexico.

Resources taken away from the transnational and organized crime arena in the post 9/11 era are giving criminals a greater chance to operate and even provide services to terrorists. After all, there are striking similarities between terrorists and individuals engaged in organized crime. Both criminal types commit fraud, theft, violent street crime, traffic in drugs and human beings, extort, intimidate, and bribe. Both do business in the legitimate economy as witnessed by the R.J. Reynolds case. Although their motives at times appear different, organized crimes focusing on making money and terrorism aiming to undermine political authority, the perpetrators have similar profiles, and are often the same individuals.

For example, the problem of cigarette smuggling is an area that can be addressed even though the profits rival those of narcotics and the relative cheapness of the goods that are being smuggled. A shipping container containing 10 million cigarettes costs as little as $100,000 to produce in China, but can bring as much as $2 million in the United States. Cigarette smuggling bolstered the entire economy of Montenegro during the 1990s. Contrast that with the small amounts it takes to conduct a terrorist attack. “Part of the problem is that it takes so little to finance an operation,” said Gary LaFree, director of the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. British authorities, for example, estimated the 2005 London subway bombing that killed 52 people succeeded on a budget of less than $15,000. Al-Qaeda’s entire 9/11 operation cost between $400,000 and $500,000, according to the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Willson, 2009). To end the flow of criminal money to terrorist groups and insurgencies, experts say, will mean cutting off the flow of contraband—whether narcotics or tobacco. Terrorism and criminal finance investigator Larry Johnson, with BERG Associates, notes that it’s much easier to crack down on the flow of legal products like tobacco. “You need to ensure that the products are being sold through legitimate channels through legitimate distributors—that they’re not committing willful blindness,” he says. “The contraband is fairly easy to deal with because it’s in the power of the distributors and producers to control the process. This is actually one of those few problems that is fixable (Willson, 2009).”

Another area that the authors believe needs to be addressed is the problem of immigration violations and how it facilitates the entry of terrorists into this country. Several kinds of document fraud can occur during the immigration process through forgery, lying, false statements, or the misuse of visas. For many terrorists, immigration violations are the first acts taken in a long line of criminal activities. Michael Cutler, a fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies, has written that when an alien acquires immigration benefits through fraud and deception, the security of the system is breached and it leaves the door open to criminal and terrorists to game the system (Cutler, 2006). Individuals who have plotted acts of terror against the United States or raised money for terrorist organizations have engaged in immigration violations such as Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, used an altered passport and fraudulent documents (Eldridge, 2004).

Janice Kephart, former counsel to the 9/11 Commission, recently authored a report titled “Immigration and Terrorism” that examines the histories of 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the United States between the early 1990s and 2004 and concluded that “about two-thirds (59) committed immigration fraud prior to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity” (Kephart, 2005). Because of these widespread terrorist violations of U.S. immigration law, Kephart suggests that the “lax immigration system” poses a danger, and recommends “strict enforcement of immigration law—at American consulates overseas, at ports of entry, and within the United States.” The fact that terrorists have in the past obtained entry to the United States and even became naturalized U.S. citizens through fraudulent means has national security implications.

Furthermore, the authors recommend government agencies develop methods to share information to create synergistic outcomes in identifying the crime-terror link. In some cases, agency regulations forbid intelligence services from gathering and sharing specific types of information that might lend clarity to the nature of the crime-terror act under investigation. Frequently when law enforcement and intelligence cultures clash, it is based on law enforcements tradition of enforcing the rule of law and justice and the pursuit of criminals where as the intelligence community tradition is the security of the nation. Terrorist plots and smuggling actions transverse both criminal and intelligence worlds and can set the cultures of law enforcement and intelligence against each other. Of note is that terrorist and criminals have linked and profited from the synergy of their shared abilities and knowledge; a similar linking that will create synergy between law enforcement and intelligence will be required.

Although there may be legitimate concerns in sharing information, one solution to the lack of communication and organized effort among the different national law enforcement agencies that serve on the edges of the blurred lines is the development of memorandums of understanding between agencies. For example, an interagency operation led to the arrests of several dozen people in Colombia associated with a Hezbollah-connected drug trafficking and a money-laundering ring. One of the affiliates to the operation indicated that identifying, monitoring and dismantling the financial, logistical, and communication linkages between illicit trafficking groups and terrorist sponsors are critical to not only ensuring early indications and warnings of potential terrorist attacks directed at the United States and our partners, but also in generating a global appreciation and acceptance of this tremendous threat to security.”

Other recommendations are that the business community should work more closely with law enforcement to detect patterns that may identify a crime-terror link. More detailed analysis of the operation of illicit activities around the world would help advance an understanding of terrorist financing. Corruption overseas, which is so often linked to facilitating organized crime and terrorism, should be elevated to a U.S. national security concern with an operational focus. A joint task force composed of analysts from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and Federal intelligence agencies should be formed immediately to create an integrated system for data collection and analysis. Finally, a broader view of today’s terrorist and criminal groups is needed, given that their methods and their motives are often shared.

Stuart (2006) reported on a contract study recently completed for the Pentagon, which states, “Although terrorism and organized crime are different phenomena, the important
fact is that terrorists and criminal networks overlap and cooperate in some enterprises. The phenomenon of the synergy of terrorism and organized crime is growing because similar conditions give rise to both and because terrorists and organized criminals use similar approaches to promote their operations. Constructing multidisciplinary working groups allows different agencies to come together not only to discuss ways to combat these organizations, but also to create win-win scenarios for agencies that cooperate.

For example, ICE's Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking Interagency Working Group (O'Connell, 2006), which includes the Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community, the FBI, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, has a targeting subgroup whose role is to identify the most dangerous international alien-smuggling networks, especially those that have links to terrorism. Since 2002, the Working Group efforts have resulted in the apprehension of more than 15 leaders of major smuggling organizations. ICE recognizes that there is a blurred line between terrorism and organized crime and that interagency cooperation is imperative to achieve operational success.

ICE is one agency that appears to understand that unless synergistic value is created to combat these organizations, successes may be limited. For example, according to O'Connell (2006), commenting on one of her agency's many initiatives, "Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of hundreds of thousands of individuals who enter our detention and removal system annually. This highly effective operation collects, evaluates, analyzes, and disseminates information from detainees in ICE custody. Customers for Operation Last Call are ICE operational units, DHS, I&A, the Intelligence Community, the FBI, and other federal agencies. This program focuses on relevant collections in the areas of force protection, anti-terrorism, ongoing criminal enterprises, human trafficking and smuggling, contraband smuggling (weapons of mass destruction, drugs, etc.) threats to critical infrastructure, and the movement of money that support illicit activities."

Operation Watchtower, working in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, analyzes international movements of vessel and cargoes to provide timely intelligence and risk assessment for investigative and threat detection support. Furthermore, O'Connell (2006) states, "Business plans and performance metrics based on objective customer evaluations must support all our work. From these markers, the ICE Intelligence strategic plan proposes the development and acquisition of advanced technologies, new techniques, new processes, and additional integration into multi-agency and multi-national operations. ICE's Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center works toward dismantling criminal travel networks that are engaged in human smuggling and trafficking. In order to cripple such networks, Clark (2006) stated, "Interagency cooperation and information exchange are of the utmost importance. The Center brings together federal agency representatives from the policy, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic arenas to work together to achieve increased progress in addressing the problems of human smuggling, human trafficking, and clandestine terrorist mobility."

The staff of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States are already overwhelmed, and a common complaint is that they do not have the time to analyze the evidence they possess, or to eliminate unnecessary avenues of investigation. The problem is not so much a lack of data, but the lack of suitable tools to evaluate that data and make optimal decisions about when and how to investigate further. The authors recommend the PIE approach developed by Shelley, along with other investigative tools that offer a practical solution to organizing the data in a meaningful way. Shelley also outlined recommendations to combat the crime-terror link and one can observe that she also favors sharing information to create synergistic value to investigations. Valuable time and resources are not wasted in constantly having agencies reinventing the wheel by duplicating information when important information is available to all parties (Lichtenwald, Perri & MacKenzie, 2009). Some of Shelley's recommendations include:

For policy analysts:
1. More detailed analysis of the operation of illicit economies where criminals and terrorists interact would improve understanding of how organized crime operates, and how it cooperates with terrorists. Domestically, more detailed analysis of the businesses where illicit transactions are most common would help investigation of organized crime—and its affiliates. More focus on the illicit activities within closed ethnic communities in urban centers and in prisons in developed countries would prove useful in addressing potential threats.

2. Corruption overseas, which is so often linked to facilitating organized crime and terrorism, should be elevated to a U.S. national security concern with an operational focus. Many jihadists are recruited because they are disgusted with the corrupt governments in their home countries. Corruption has facilitated the commission of criminal acts such as the Chechen suicide bombers who brieﬁed airport personnel to board aircraft in Moscow.

3. Analysts must study patterns of organized crime-terrorism interaction as guidance for what may be observed subsequently in the United States. For instance, Hezbollah smuggling of cigarettes in the Tri-Border Area was subsequently found in North Carolina.

4. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies need more analysts with the expertise to understand the motivations and methods of criminal and terrorist groups around the globe, and with the linguistic and other skills to collect and analyze sufﬁcient data.

For investigators:
1. The separation of criminals and terrorists is not always as clear cut as many investigators believe. Crime and terrorist groups are often indistinguishable in conﬁlict zones and in prisons. They also have overlaps such as in the recent large-scale IRA attack on a bank.

2. The hierarchical structure and conservative habits of the Sicilian Mafia no longer serves as an appropriate model for organized crime investigations. Most organized crime groups now operate as loose networked afﬁliations. In this respect they have more in common with terrorist groups.

3. The PIE method provides a series of indicators that can result in superior proﬁles and higher-quality risk analysis for law enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad. The approach can be reﬁned with sensitive or classiﬁed information.
4. Greater cooperation between the military and the FBI would allow useful sharing of intelligence, such as the substantial knowledge on crime and illicit transactions gleaned by the counterintelligence branch of the U.S. military that is involved in conflict regions where crime-terror interaction is most profound.

5. Law enforcement personnel must develop stronger working relationships with the business sector. In the past, there has been too little recognition of possible terrorist-organized crime interaction among the clients of private-sector business corporations and banks. In the spirit of public-private partnerships, corporations and banks should be placed under an obligation to watch for indications of organized crime or terrorist activity by their clients and business associates and pass on to law enforcement.

6. Law enforcement must work more with different sectors of the business community which are emerging sectors for money laundering connected with terrorist financing, i.e., real estate and art. Credit card fraud is becoming a major funding source for international terrorists. Law enforcement analysts should work more closely with corporations to understand the trends that highlight organized crime-terror involvement in this emerging area.

7. Law enforcement personnel posted overseas by federal agencies such as the DEA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement should help develop a better picture of the geography of organized crime and its most important features (i.e., the watch points of the PIE approach).

8. Training for law enforcement officers at federal, state, and local level in identifying authentic and forged passports, visas, and other documents required for residency in the U.S. would eliminate a major shortcoming in investigations of criminal networks.

Conclusion
A report titled “Feds worry that terrorists, mobsters might collaorate” (WHDH-TV, October 14, 2006) referenced the apprehension about the collaboration between a mobster and a terrorist organization. As this article has pointed out, mobsters and terrorists have been collaborating well before this report was disclosed in 2006. What is crucial in the fight against this link is the need to consider how information is gathered, analyzed, and shared by intelligence agencies. It is through the interagency workgroups approach that the PIE method will produce the most effective results. Just as criminals and terrorists pool their talents to achieve synergistic outcomes to fulfill their motives, U.S. government agencies and our allies must be in a position to pool their talents to combat this scourge. Moreover, traditional difficulties often experienced across intelligence agencies may be minimized by accessing the wealth of knowledge possessed by forensic examiners across disciplines, especially since terrorists risk exposure by engaging in traditional criminal activities that leaves a trail of evidence.

References
Kaplan, D., Fang, B. & Sangwan, S. (2005). Paying for terror; how jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics and profits— to finance attacks on targets around the globe; Afghanistan; India. U.S. News & World Report.
Terrorists are often funded through a variety of methods, including fraud and theft, which can be difficult to detect. In the case of Hezbollah, for example, the group has been linked to the sale of cigarettes and tobacco, which provides a source of income for the organization.

In addition to traditional methods of funding, such as the sale of cigarettes, Hezbollah has also been involved in other criminal activities, such as the smuggling of weapons and the sale of illegal drugs. These activities provide a steady stream of income for the group, which can be used to support its operations.

The group has also been linked to the sale of stolen identity information, which is used by criminals to gain access to financial institutions and other sources of funding. This type of fraud is also difficult to detect and can provide a significant source of income for the group.

Ultimately, the funding mechanisms used by Hezbollah and other terrorist groups are complex and varied. By understanding the different methods by which these groups are able to fund their operations, law enforcement officials can better target their efforts to disrupt these activities and prevent the growth of terrorism.